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Abstract. The theoretical literature on technological competition has been
mostly concerned with various aspects of innovative activity in a single mar-
ket. By contrast, this paper studies the adoption of a sequence of product
innovations in two markets characterized by a common technology base,
and illustrates the effects of technological rivalry and preemption. Under
a perfect information scenario, it is shown in a two incumbent model that
if the innovation is drastic (total replacement of the old product), under
certain conditions the fear of being preempted by the entrant forces the
firms to diversify their product lines by adopting the innovations across each
other’s markets. On the other hand, with non-drastic innovation (partial re-
placement of the old product), it is more likely for the firms to diversify
in their own product lines. Out of a class of equilibria characterized un-
der non-drastic innovation, one is optimal in which innovations are adopted
in the firms’ own markets. In the Pareto inferior equilibria, the firms ei-
ther adopt innovations in each other’s market so that incumbency changes
hands or jointly adopt both innovations in two separate product lines. Perfect
Bayesian equilibria are characterized under an asymmetric information sce-
nario where one of the firms is assumed to have complete information about
the relevant costs of adopting an innovation in a separate product line. If
the priors are based on pessimism, it is more often subject to exploitation
by the informed firm leading to pooling equilibrium, while optimistism more
often leads to diversification and to a competitive market structure in both
product lines under a separating equilibrium. In all the cases considered,
both innovations are adopted, and in most cases they are adopted by the
high cost entrant. The former is socially desirable, but the latter is not.
More competitiveness necessarily implies wasteful expenditure by the high
cost firm. Lack of competitiveness and technological rivalry, on the other
hand, imply that maximum product diversity may not be achieved.
Keywords: tehnological rivalry, preemption, adoption of innovations, up-
grading.
1. Introduction
Almost all product innovations in recent times have been part of a sequence of in-
novations and upgrades in a certain product line rather than being a totally generic
innovation that has never been materialized before. Once a product innovation has
been first adopted in its most rudimentary form and has been successful in the
market, it is almost certain that successive generations of upgraded versions with
additional features will follow. As successive innovations generate rich product di-
versity in the marketplace, it is always those firms at the cutting edge of technology
which persistently carry out R&D activity for upgrading and “perfecting” the prod-
uct, to achieve or maintain a monopoly position that will skim the profits until a
next generation product comes along. This, simply, is the Schumpeterian innovative
process.
We also observe in the “sequences of innovations” process that the upgrad-
ing products will incorporate developments and/or findings of other product lines.
While the underlying basic science required for a certain product innovation in a
sequence of innovations could be very distinct from another innovation in a sepa-
rate product line, it is becoming more likely that both product lines will share and
contain the latest developments in some other technology and R&D base. Examples
of these innovations and ‘add ons’ are all around us in cell phones, digital cameras,
pocket pcs (PDAs), portable audio, video, digital imaging, communiation and stor-
age devices. We observe many other examples of technological convergence in recent
product generations especially in consumer electronics industries that is fuelled by
the shrinking size of semiconductors .
I call the process in which composite technologies are increasingly embodied
in generations of successive product innovations “technological convergence”. For
example, cameras and camcorders use the same optics technology base. As they
become more ‘sophisticated’ we observe that microprocessors of various sort are
being incorporated to increase their functions and capacity. VHS recorders followed
by 8 mm camcorders which also function as players, are now being replaced with
digital recording and digital cameras which all can be incorporated in a cell phone
with still and movie camera features. This sequence illustrates the common practice
of leading firms of technologically progressive industries diversifying their R&D
base further from their initially established technological base, as the composite
technology required to upgrade a product becomes increasingly diverse.
This aspect of increasing product diversification under technological convergence
has been ignored in the theoretical R&D and innovation adoption literature. Ac-
cording to the prevailing theory firms may diversify into multiple product lines in re-
sponse to excess capacity of productive factors (Montgomery and Wernerfelt, 1988).
Accordingly, technological scope economies embodied in the excess heterogeneous
productive factors create incentives to diversify1. In this article I attempt to explain
firm diversification based on strategic adoption of innovations and add on features.
Specifically, I explore the effects of the strategic adoption of product innovations by
separate monopolists on market structure. I conjecture that most innovations which
are subject to strategic behavior on the part of the innovating or adopting firms are
part of a sequence of innovations in a product line. By a “sequence of innovations” in
a product line I mean a series of either qualitative (better functioning and/or more
1 In related literature Aron stresses the principal agent relationship between the owners
and managers of firms and shows that diversification is an optimal response to the moral
hazard problem facing firms’ owners (Aron, 1988).
durable, etc.)2 or quantitative (with additional functions/features incorporated)3 ,
or some combination of both, upgrading opportunities. Rosen calls this process‘add-
on innovations,’ (Rosen, 1991) but emphasises only the case of process innovations.
I follow Reinganum’s (Reinganum, 1985) market driven definition of innovation, but
focus only on the product innovations instead of process innovations. Reinganum
calls an innovation “drastic” if the innovator becomes a monopolist in the post
adoption market. I, instead, call an innovation drastic if the add-on technology that
upgrades the product makes the previous version obsolete by completely replacing
it. Hence, a drastic innovation that embodies an add-on technology can be adopted
by more than one firm. Consider the audio cassette tapes that almost totally re-
placed the earlier betamax tapes, or the color TV that in most part replaced the
black and white TV which in turn will possibly be replaced by HDTV in the very
near future. These are new products that use the same basic technology with the
old products. Similarly, a non-drastic innovation that partly replaces the old prod-
uct – in the sense of a demand shift – can make the adopting firm a monopolist
in the upgraded product market. Sony, for example, used to be a monopoly in the
‘recordable CD player’ market in the early 1990’s while the ‘CD player’ market was
competitive. Consequently, a single success does not mean that the successful firm
reaps monopoly profits forever (Reinganum, 1985). Rather, monopoly profits are
earned only until the next, better innovation is developed and successfully adopted
by the innovative firm and is accepted by the consumers 4
2 Examples to the idea of qualitative upgrading could be found in the innovations in
pharmaceuticals industry (in headache pills and cold medicine market it would imply
rapid effectiveness and fewer side effects), synthetics industry (in cassette/video tapes
and photograph films/digital imagemaking industry it would imply higher resolution),
and high definition TV (better picture quality).
3 Examples to the quantitative upgrading would be certain products in consumer elec-
tronics industry (calculators, computers, DVD players, cell phones, cameras, and etc).
4 Take the case of Home Video Revolution:Ampex in 1963 offered the first consumer
version of a videotape recorder at an exorbitant price of $30,000; other iterations would
follow, such as Sony’s introduction of the videocassette recorder (VCR) in 1969, and the
introduction of the U-Matic in 1972.In 1972, the AVCO CartriVision system was the
first videocassette recorder to have pre-recorded tapes of popular movies (from Columbia
Pictures) for sale and rental – three years before Sony’s Betamax system emerged into
the market. However, the company went out of business a year later The appearance
of Sony’s Betamax (the first home VCR or videocassette recorder) in 1975 offered a
cheaper sales price of $2,000 and recording time up to one hour; this led to a boom in
sales - it was a technically-superior format when compared to the VHS system that was
marketed by JVC and Matsushita beginning in 1976 In 1976, Paramount became the
first to authorize the release of its film library onto Betamax videocassettes. In 1977,
20th Century Fox would follow suit, and begin releasing its films on videotape In 1977,
RCA introduced the first VCRs in the United States based on JVC’s system, capable
of recording up to four hours on 1/2” videotape.By the late 70s, Sony’s market share
in sales of Betamax VCRs was below that of sales of VHS machines; consumers chose
the VHS’ longer tape time and larger tape size, over Sony’s smaller and shorter tape
time (of 1 hour). Video sales - the first films on videotape were released by the Magnetic
Video Corporation (a company founded in 1968 by Andre Blay in Detroit, Michigan, the
first video distribution company) - it licensed fifty films for release from 20th Century
The idea of the models used in this paper is that each monopolist must choose
either to preserve its own monopoly position by adopting an innovation in its prod-
uct line or to challenge the incumbent monopolist in another market by adopting
an innovation in that product line. Special features of the models arise from the
differential costs in adopting innovations across separate product lines. Namely, if
there is a product innovation to be adopted, any firm that is considering adoption
is a potential entrant to the market which the adoption is expected to create. With
the assumption that innovations have no patent protection and are common knowl-
edge to all firms, the cost of entry to the potential market is the cost of adopting
the innovation. I maintain that the cost of adoption would not be identical across
existing firms considering undertaking R&D for this purpose. Unless the innovation
is an original idea unrelated to any existing product market, the costs of adoption
will be different across firms, depending on how suitable each firm’s R&D program
is to the requirements of adoption and how close its existing product line(s) is to
the innovation under consideration. If the innovation is part of a sequence of inno-
vations in a product line, the existing firm(s) in that product line would have a cost
advantage in adoption. This is due to the experience in production and learning by
doing in R&D as well as the already established and technologically substitutable
cospecialized assets which they might simply alter for the new product. This paper
seeks to shed light on the importance of cost advantages in adoption and answers
the question why firms sometimes give up these advantages and choose to enter a
new market.
The theoretical literature on R&D and the adoption of new technologies has
been concerned with different aspects of innovative activity in a single market. One
main body of research concentrates on the incentives and the process of bring-
ing about inventions. To cite a few representative contributions among many, see:
(Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), (Dasgupta, 1986) on the industrial structure, uncer-
tainty and the speed of R&D; (Harris and Vickers, 1985), on patent races and per-
sistence of monopoly (Gilbert and Newberry, 1982); and on licensing of innovations
and network externalities (Katz and Shapiro, 1985).
Another line of research concentrates on the strategic aspects of the adoption
of new technologies, again among the many, the following are few representative
contributions: on the timing of innovation and the diffusion of new technology
Fox for $300,000 in October, 1977; it began to license, market and distribute half-inch
videotape cassettes (both Betamax and VHS) to consumers; it was the first company
to sell pre-recorded videos; M*A*S*H (1970) was Magnetic’s most popular title.Video
rentals - in 1977, George Atkinson of Los Angeles began to advertise the rental of 50
Magnetic Video titles of his own collection in the Los Angeles Times, and launched
the first video rental store, Video Station, on Wilshire Boulevard, renting videos for
$10/day; within 5 years, he franchised more than 400 Video Station stores across the
country.In 1978, Philips introduced the video laser disc (aka laserdisc and LD) – the
first optical disc storage media for the consumer market; Pioneer began selling home
LaserDisc players in 1980; eventually, the laserdisc systems would be replaced by the
DVD (”digital versatile disc”) format in the late 1990s.VHS video players, laser disc
players and the release of films on videocassette tapes and discs multiplied as prices
plummeted, creating a new industry and adding substantial revenue and profits for the
movie studios. (15 April 2007 ¡http://www.filmsite.org/70sintro.html¿.)
(Reinganum, 1981); on rent dissipation (Fudenberg and Tirole, 1985, 1987); on
market entry dynamics (Smirnov and Wait, 2007); on the sequence of innovations
and industry evolution (Reinganum, 1985), (Vickers, 1986); and on divisionalization
(Schwartz and Thompson, 1986).
The main effects governing R&D and technological rivalry have been mostly ana-
lyzed using game theoretical tools. The results, with a few exceptions (Arrow, 1962),
generally support Schumpeter’s (Schumpeter, 1942) thesis that monopoly situations
and innovativeness are intimately related. Nevertheless, the focus has been on a sin-
gle market where an incumbent and an entrant engage in some sort of technological
supremacy game mostly for process innovations rather than product innovations.
The existing literature does not address the issues related to substitutability in
basic science and technology when separate firms engage in strategic competition
in R&D. That literature mostly treats an innovation as a generic idea unrelated to
any existing product line. Furthermore, models which consider sequences of inno-
vations (Reinganum, 1985), (Mclean and Riordan, 1989)) do not establish the links
between the sequence of innovations in separate product lines. These links can be
quite important depending on the technology and R&D base which is common
knowledge to the firms sharing it. The knowledge of the common technology and
R&D base enables firms considering adoption of an innovation to recognize their po-
tential challengers and their relative strengths and weaknesses. The empirical work
of Cockburn and Henderson (1994) is an exception to this. The authors studied
research activity by 10 major pharmaceutical companies in pursuit of the discovery
of ethical drugs over 17 years and have found the presence of complementarities and
spillovers between firms leading to multiple prizes out of a single R&D race. Hence,
the authors show that the implication of the early theoretical ”racing” models are
inconsistent with the causal facts and their empirical results.
Of the product innovations mentioned earlier, I first focus on the drastic inno-
vations using the perfect information framework. Following the general structure of
the basic model, strategic competition for the new product markets are analyzed
under three separate cases. Using the competitive payoffs as a benchmark for classi-
fying the type of innovations, the Nash equilibrium points (NEP) are characterized.
Under high cost drastic innovations the model is shown to represent a prisoner’s
dilemma situation where the firms only diversify, and hence switch their product
lines. Under medium cost drastic innovations where pure strategy equilibrium does
not exist, the mixed strategy equilibrium is characterized using a theorem. Follow-
ing this, an example of mixed strategy equilibrium is presented which satisfies the
criteria developed in the theorem.
Next, the basic model is modified to the case of non-drastic innovations. The
assumption of symmetry in payoffs is relaxed by allowing differential market growth
in separate product lines. The model is shown to yield equilibria where product up-
grading is the more preferred best reply strategy. High cost non-drastic innovations
are shown to exhibit multiplicity of equilibria. Under medium cost non-drastic in-
novations equilibrium it is proved that firms prefer upgrading, whereas under low
cost non-drastic innovations the equilibrium is characterized where the preferred
strategy is upgrading and diversifying into both markets.
2. Drastic Innovation Under Perfect Information
The following model assumes that there is no uncertainty related with post-adoption
market conditions, and that a firm will successfully replace the old product if it
adopts the innovation in that product line. Total replacement of the old product by
making it obsolete is the ’drastic’ nature of the innovation. Secondly, it is assumed
that all agents involved in the innovative process are perfectly informed about all
payoff relevant parameters of all agents, and that this perfect information is common
knowledge to all agents.5
Consider a two period game with two identical firms sharing the closest technol-
ogy base in two separate markets. In period one, assume that two separate products
are exclusively and successfully produced by the two firms. Let firm 1 be the mo-
nopolist producing a1, and firm 2 be the monopolist producing a2. Both firms are
earning monopoly profits equal to pim. Firm 1, (2) can adopt a′1, (a
′
2) (the innovation
in its own product line) with a cost c , and it can adopt a′2, (a
′
1) (the innovation in
the other firm’s product line) with a cost kc where k > 1, or adopt both innovations
with a cost c(1 + k), where c(1 + k) ≤ pim.
Firms can adopt four strategies in this non-cooperative, one shot game : adopt
a′1, adopt a
′
2, adopt both a
′
1 & a
′
2, or adopt neither (stick with the existing product).
If they both adopt either a′1 or a
′
2 they compete as Cournot duopolists in that
product line. Both firms earn Cournot profits equal to pic in this case. If only one
firm adopts, it totally replaces the old product and becomes a monopolist earning
monopoly profits equal to pim in that product line. Symmetry assumptions about
period two profits and markets are restrictive but they focus the analysis on the
role that incumbency plays in the adoption of new technologies. The assumption
of equal profits in period one is also due to the same consideration. I introduce the
following notation:
pimij : Per period monopoly profit of firm i in market j , {i,j = 1,2}
picij: Per period Cournot profit of firm i in market j, if it shares the market with
the other firm.
ciu: Cost to firm i of upgrading its product line by adopting the innovation in own
market i
cid: Cost to firm i of diversifying into another market by adopting the innovation
in market j .
Following restrictions are consistent with our discussion above.
pimij > pi
c
1j + pi
c
2j ; pi
m
ij > pi
c
i1 + pi
c
i2 ; pi
c
1d = pi
c
2d (i)
cid = kciu , k > 1 (ii)
pimij ≥ cid ∀ i, j = 1, 2 (iii)
Inequalities in equation (i) are a general result of Cournot model (Tirole, 1988),
(Shy, 2000), and symmetry assumptions imposed on the firms and markets. Accord-
ingly, monopoly profits in one market strictly exceed the total Cournot profits of
both firms in that market. Alternately, the total of Cournot profits any firm can
5 See (Binmore, 1990).
earn in two separate markets is strictly less than monopoly profits it can earn in
one market.
Equation (ii) states that the cost of adopting the innovation in any firm’s product
line is strictly less than the cost of adopting the innovation in the other product
line. In other words, diversifying is costlier than upgrading.
Equation (iii) imposes the restriction that payoffs to being a monopolist in any
market are non-negative. If the inequality holds for the incumbent but not for the
entrant, lacking any threat of entry, there would be no incentive for the incumbent
to adopt the innovation in its own product line since it would simply be replacing
itself as a monopolist. Thus the restriction eliminates only a trivial case.
The following notation is introduced to simplify the characterization and man-
ageability of the model. Accordingly the pure strategies for firm i are denoted by:
si1 : no action (stick with the existing product)
si2 : upgrade only (adopt the innovation in own product line)
si3 : diversify only (adopt the innovation in the competitor’s product line)
si4 : upgrade and diversify (adopt both innovations)
Payoffs of the game are defined in terms of period 2 flow profits minus the cost
of adoption. I use the following notation to denote the payoffs:
pimi : monopoly profits of firm i in own market i when no upgrading and entry has
taken place
V mid : monopoly profits in other market j , (requires i to adopt an innovation that
allows it to diversify into market j )
V miu : monopoly profits in own market i , (requires i to adopt an innovation that
allows it to upgrade its product)
V ciu : profits in own market i when product is upgraded but competitor has diver-
sified and entered market i
V cid : profits in other market j when i has diversified but incumbent has upgraded.
picii : profits of firm i in own market i when no upgrading has taken place and
entrant has diversified in the upgraded product, (by definition, picii = 0 for
drastic innovations)
For example, suppose in period two, firm 1 decides to stick with its existing
product a1, and firm 2 diversifies by adopting a′1. Since by definition of drastic
innovations, a′1 totally replaces the market for a1, firm 1 (the incumbent) is preyed
upon by firm 2 (the entrant) in its own market. Firm 1 becomes a monopolist in both
product lines producing a′1 and a2. Thus, the payoffs to firm 1 and 2 respectively
are {0 , pim22 + Vm2d}.
Clearly the best scenario for each firm is that the incumbent monopolist sticks
with its old product while the entrant adopts the innovation. Under this scenario, the
more aggressive firm preys upon the stagnant incumbent and becomes a monopoly
in both markets. In the following section, I characterize the equilibrium strategies
of the players, and classify the results under different restrictions on the Cournot
profits and the cost of adoption in the two product lines. Table 1. depicts the normal
form representation of the general model under drastic innovations.
Firm 1
Firm 2
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11
pim11
pim22
pim11
V m2u
0
pim22 + V
m
2d
0
V m2u + V
m
2d
s12
V m1u
pim22
V m1u
V m2u
V c1u
pim22 + V
c
2d
V c1u
V m2u + V
m
2d
s13
pim11 + V
m
1d
0
pim11 + V
c
1d
V c2u
V m1d
V m2d
V c1d
V c2u + V
m
2d
s14
V m1u + V
m
1d
0
V m1u + V
c
1d
V c2u
V c1u + V
m
1d
V c2d
V c1u + V
c
1d
V c2u + V
c
2d
Table 1. Strategic game with drastic innovations under perfect information.
The solution concept employed is payoff dominance. This method assumes eco-
nomic agents behave rationally and it is common knowledge to the players that each
player would play rationally. When players consider any two strategies , they would
compare their payoffs in each cell of the corresponding strategies of the normal form.
If in all pairwise comparisons one strategy yields payoffs that are strictly greater
than the other, at least in one comparison and are equal in all the others, then it is
said that the first strategy weakly dominates the second one. After players eliminate
all dominated strategies, the game is then played on the remaining undominated
strategies. Finally, Nash equilibrium point(s) (NEP) are searched.
Nash equilibrium points (NEP’s) are strategy combinations s∗1i , s
∗
2i, that are
best replies to each other, such that E1(s∗1 , s
∗
2,) = max
s11i
E1 (s1 , s∗2) and E2 (s
∗
1 , s
∗
2) =
max
s2i
E2 (s∗1 , s2) where (si, sj) is the combination of the i’ th strategy of firm 1 and
j’ th strategy of firm 2.
Differences in the cost of adopting an innovation for the incumbent and the
entrant result in three separate cases to consider.
Case 1 : picij ≤ ciu < cid , ∀ i,j = 1,2 {V ciu ≤ 0 , V cid < 0}
Case 2 : ciu < cid ≤ picij , ∀ i,j = 1,2 {V ciu > 0 , V cid ≥ 0}
Case 3 : ciu < picij < cid , ∀ i,j = 1,2 {V ciu > 0 , V cid < 0}
Case 1 characterizes a situation where the net payoff to a firm when both firms
undertake the same innovation in a given market is non-positive. I call this type of
innovation as ”high-cost” in this framework. Under Case 2 the net payoff to the firm,
which is the Cournot profits net of adoption cost, is non-negative. I call this type of
innovation ”low-cost”. Finally, Case 3 defines an intermediate scenario denoted as
”medium cost”. In the following sections the NEP’s are characterized for each case.
2.1. High Cost Drastic Innovations
The conditions used in classifying an innovation as high-cost are (i) diversifying
with an upgraded product is not profitable (V cid < 0), and (ii) competition in
an upgraded product is not profitable either (V ciu ≤ 0). Next, the payoff dominant
strategies -if they exist- are searched for, and after eliminating all possible dominated
strategies the NEP’s in pure strategies are found. If pure strategy NEP’s do not
exist, equilibrium in mixed strategies is characterized.
Lemma 1. Suppose picij ≤ ciu < cid, ∀ i,j = 1,2 {V ciu ≤ 0 ; V cid < 0}. Then,
(a) pi1(s1, s) ≥ pi1(s2, s) and pi2(s, s1) ≥ pi2(s, s2) ∀ s
(b) pi1(s3, s) ≥ pi1(s4, s) and pi2(s, s3) ≥ pi2(s, s4) ∀ s,
where pii(sk, sl) is i’ s payoff when firm 1 chooses skand firm 2 chooses sl.
(proof: see the appendix for all proofs not given in the main body of the text.)
Proposition 1. Under drastic innovation where picij ≤ iu < cid, the NEP is the
strategy combination{s3, s3} with payoffs (V m1d ;V m2d). Thus the monopolists cross
over and diversify into the other firm’s market.
Remark 1. Since innovations are drastic, there is a one-hundred percent replace-
ment of the incumbent’s product line. From the firms’ point of view (s1, s1) may be
the “better” outcome; yet it is not self-enforcing and therefore not “stable”. They
are facing a classic ’prisoner’s dilemma’ situation. Thus, each incumbent is pre-
empted by the other monopolist, so that the monopolists switch markets. Although
both innovations are adopted, the outcome is sub-optimal not only from the firms’
viewpoint but also from a social standpoint since high cost entrants rather than the
low cost incumbents are undertaking the adoption of innovations.
Example: pimi = 10 , ciu = 4 , cid = 5 , V
m
iu = 6 , V
m
id = 5 , V
c
iu = −1 , V cid =
−2. It is a simple exercise to plug in the values above into the generalized normal
form given in table 1 and see that {s3, s3} is the NEP with corresponding payoffs
of (5,5). High Cost Drastic Innovations: picij<ciu < cid (V
c
iu < 0 ; V
c
id < 0)
Example: pimi = 10 , ciu= 4 , cid= 5 , V
m
iu =6 , V
m
id =5 , V
c
iu =-1 , V
c
iu =-2 .
Firm 1
Firm 2
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11 10 , 10 10 , 6 0 , 15 0 , 11
s12 6 , 10 6 , 6 −1 , 8 −1 , 4
s13 15 , 0 8 ,−1 5 , 5∗ −2 , 4
s14 11 , 0 4 ,−1 4 , 2 −3 ,−3
Example
Fig. 1. High cost drastic innovations.
2.2. Low Cost Drastic Innovations
I say the innovations are low cost when both the diversification to compete with
an upgraded product, and the competition in an upgraded product are profitable (
V ciu > 0; V
c
id ≥ 0). In other words, no matter what the rival firm does, undertaking
an innovation is profitable for both the entrant firm and the incumbent firm.
Lemma 2. Suppose ciu < cid ≤ picij , ∀ i, j = 1, 2 , {V ciu > 0 , V cid ≥ 0}. Then
(a) pi1(s3, s) ≥ pi1(s1, s) , pi2(s, s3) ≥ pi2(s, s1) ∀ s
(b) pi1(s4, s) ≥ pi1(s2, s) , pi2(s, s4) ≥ pi2(s, s2) ∀ s
where pii(sk, sl) is i’ s payoff when firm 1 chooses sk and firm 2 chooses sl.
Proposition 2. Under drastic innovation where ciu < cid ≤ picij , the NEP is the
strategy combination {s4, s4} with payoffs (V c1u + V c1d ; V c2u + V c2d). Thus, the mo-
nopolists upgrade and diversify in both product lines by adopting both innovations.
Remark 2. Since competitive payoffs following a joint adoption of an innovation
are greater than or equal to zero in each market, the monopolists upgrade and di-
versify in order to avoid being preempted by the entrant. The outcome is clearly pro
competitive even though the monopolists spend greater portion of their resources
for a product innovation in which they have a comparative disadvantage. Their
monopoly positions are replaced with Cournot Competition. Notice that in the re-
duced game the firms face a prisoner’s dilemma situation as in the previous case of
high cost innovations.
Example: pimi = 10 , ciu = 2 , cid = 3 V
m
iu = 8 , V
m
id = 7 , V
c
iu = 2 , V
c
id = 1
It is a simple exercise to plug in the values above into the generalized normal form
given in table 1 and see that {s4, s4} is the only NEP with corresponding payoffs
of (3,3).
Firm 1
Firm 2
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11 10 , 10 10 , 8 0 , 17 0 , 15
s12 8 , 10 8 , 8 2 , 11 2 , 9
s13 17 , 0 11 , 2 7 , 7 1 , 9
s14 15 , 0 9 , 2 9 , 1 3 , 3
∗
Example
Fig. 2. Low cost drastic innovations.
2.3. Medium Cost Drastic Innovations
Innovations are classified as medium cost under the following assumptions. The
first is the condition that diversifying to compete with an upgraded product is not
profitable, i.e., V cid < 0. Second is the condition that competition in an upgraded
product is profitable, i.e., V ciu > 0. These conditions. together with case 1 and case
2 exhaust the payoff spectrum under all possible strategy combinations chosen by
the incumbent and the entrant. The idea of ’medium cost’ embodies within it the
concept of comparative advantage of being established in a product line. All else
being equal, if the incumbent has to compete with an entrant in a product that it
has upgraded, the incumbent will prevail and prey upon the entrant. Knowing its
comparative disadvantage, the entrant will enter only if can secure a monopoly on
the product line it is diversifying into. On the other hand, the incumbent monopolist
is reasoning that if it does not adopt the innovation and upgrade its product, it will
be preyed upon by a successful entrant -no matter how much a cost disadvantage
exists. Because of the drastic nature of the innovation, no matter who adopts it,
the existing product will be obsolete.
It is easy to see that there are not any payoff dominated strategies that can be
eliminated to simplify the solution. It is also straightforward to verify that there
are no NEP in pure strategies in this game either. Therefore, the NEP’s has to be
characterized using mixed strategies.
Let α = (α1, α2, α3, α4) denote firm 1’s mixed strategy and β = (β1, β2, β3, β4)
denote firm 2’s mixed strategy. Then, write the expected payoffs for each firm as
follows:
E1(α, β) = α1(β1 + β2)pim11 + α2{(β1 + β2)V
m
1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u}
+ α3{(β1 + β2)pim11 + (β1 + β3)V
m
1d + (β2 + β4)V
c
1d}
+ α4{(β1 + β2)V m1u + (β1 + β3)V
m
1d + (β2 + β4)V
c
1d + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u}
E2(α, β) = β1(α1 + α2)pim22 + β2{(α1 + α2)V
m
2u + (α3 + α4)V
c
2u}
+ β3{(α1 + α2)pim22 + (α1 + α3)V
m
2d + (α2 + α4)V
c
2d}
+ β4{(α1 + α2)V m2u + (α1 + α3)V
m
2d + (α2 + α4)V
c
2d + (α3 + α4)V
c
2u}
Proposition 3. Assume V miu < pi
m
ii , V
c
iu > 0, V
c
id < 0 ∀ i = 1, 2. Then, any NEP
in mixed strategies must satisfy the following :
(β1 + β3)V m1d + (β2 + β4)V
c
1d = 0 (1)
(α1 + α3)V
m
2d + (α2 + α4)V
c
2d = 0 (2)
Proposition 4. Under the assumptions of Proposition 3, any NEP in mixed strate-
gies must satisfy the following :
(α1 + α2)pim22 = (α1 + α2)V
m
2u + (α3 + α4)V
c
2u (3)
(β1 + β2)pim11 = (β1 + β2)V
m
1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u (4)
Theorem 1. ∀ picij and picii such that, ciu < picij< cid, V
m
iu < pi
m
ii {i,j=1,2} holds, the
set of all mixed strategy NEP’s satisfies:
(β1 + β3)V m1d + (β2 + β4)V
c
1d = 0
(β1 + β2)(pim11 − V m1u)− (β3 + β4)V c1u = 0
β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 = 1, βi ≥ 0
(α1 + α3)V
m
2d + (α2 + α4)V
c
2d = 0
(α1 + α2)(pim22 − V m2u)− (α3 + α4)V
c
2u = 0
α1 + α2 + α3 + α4 = 1, αi ≥ 0
where α and β are firm 1’s and firm 2’s mixed strategies respectively.
Proof of Theorem 1 : This theorem is a consequence of the definition of
medium cost drastic innovations, and of Propositions 3 and 4.
The corresponding expected payoffs are:
E1(α, β) = α1(β1 + β2)pim11 + α2{(β1 + β2)V m1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u}+ α3(β1 + β2)pim11
+ α4{(β1 + β2)V m1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u}
E2(α, β) = β1(α1 + α2)pim22 + β2{(α1 + α2)V
m
2u + (α3 + α4)V
c
2u}+ β3(α1 + α2)pim22
+ β4{(α1 + α2)V m2u + (α3 + α4)V
c
2u}.
Simplifying the equations in NEP* we obtain:
(α1 + α2) =
V
c
2u
pim22 − V m2u + V c2u
(5)
(α3 + α4) =
pim22 − V
m
2u
pim22 − V c2u
(6)
(α1 + α3) =
V
c
2d
V
m
2d − V c2d
(7)
(α2 + α4) =
V
m
2d
V
m
2d − V c2d
(8)
Remark 3. From (5) we note that the lower is the cost of upgrading , the more
likely is that the incumbent will stay in own product line and upgrade its product .
Similarly, from (6) we note that the higher is the cost of upgrading , the more likely
is that the entrant will either cross over to a separate product line or diversify into
both product lines.
In the following numerical example I find the range of individual probabilities
for mixed strategy NEP’s.
Example : pimij =10, pi
c
ij=4 ∀ i,j = 1,2 ; ciu=3, cid=5 V miu = 7 , V mid =
5 , V ciu = 1 , V
c
id = −1
The following table depicts the normal form representation of this example.
Firm 1
Firm 2
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11 10 , 10 10 , 7 0 , 15 0 , 12
s12 7 , 10 7 , 7 1 , 9 1 , 6
s13 15 , 0 9 , 1 5 , 5 −1 , 6
s14 12 , 0 6 , 1 6 ,−1 0 , 0
Example
Fig. 3. Medium cost drastic innovations.
Let A1,...,A4 be the expected payoffs firm 1 will receive if firm 2 plays the mixed
strategies (β1, ..., β4) and let B1,...,B4 be the expected payoffs firm 2 will receive if
firm 1 plays the mixed strategies (α1, ..., α4). Then, using the payoffs in the example,
the following linear equation systems are set up for firm 1 and firm 2 respectively.
A1 = pi1(s1, β) = 10β1 + 10β2
A2 = pi1(s2, β) = 7β1 + 7β2 + β3 + β4
A3 = pi1(s3, β) = 15β1 + 9β2 + 5β3 − β4
A4 = pi1(s4, β) = 12β1 + 6β2 + 6β3
B1 = pi2(α, s1) = 10α1 + 10α2
B2 = pi2(α, s2) = 7α1 + 7α2 + α3 + α4
B3 = pi2(α, s3) = 15α1 + 9α2 + 5α3 − α4
B4 = pi2(α, s4) = 12α1 + 6α2 + 6α3
Equating A1=A4 , A2=A4 , A3=A4 and using the constraint that the sum of
the probabilities of random strategies is equal to one
∑4
i=1 βi = 1, I proceed to find
the interior solution to the following system for firm 1.
2β1 − 4β2 + 6β3 = 0 (i)
5β1 − β2 + 5β3 − β4 = 0 (ii)
−3β1 − 3β2 + β3 + β4 = 0 (iii)
β1 + β2 + β3 + β4 = 0 (iv)
We also want to place the restriction that β1, β2, β3, β4 ≥ 0 . Note that (i) - (ii)
= (iii). Therefore, we eliminate (i). From (iii) we have,
(β1 + β2) =
(β3 + β4)
3
.
Substituting this into (iv) we obtain,
(β3 + β4)
3
+ (β3 + β4) = 1
or,
(β3 + β4) =
3
4
{
=
pim11 − V
m
1u
pim11 − V m1u + V c1u
}
(9)
It follows that,
(β1 + β2) =
1
4
{
=
V
c
1u
pim11 − V m1u + V c1u
}
. (10)
From (ii) we have,
5(β1 + β3) = (β2 + β4).
Substituting this into (iv) we obtain,
β1 + β3 + 5(β1 + β3) = 1
or,
(β1 + β3) =
1
6
{
= − V
c
1d
V
m
1d − V c1d
}
. (11)
It follows that,
(β2 + β4) =
5
6
{
=
V m1d
V
m
1d − V c1d
}
. (12)
We have shown that equations (9) through (12) satisfy equations (5) through
(8) respectively. It is also immediate that, from equations (9) through (12) we can
write the following conditions:
0 ≤ β1 ≤ 16 , 0 ≤ β2 ≤
1
4
, 0 ≤ β3 ≤ 16 , 0 ≤ β4 ≤
3
4
(13)
Hence, it is seen that, in this example, any interior solution for the mixed strategy
equilibria must satisfy (13). Simulations show that one solution that satisfies the
non-negativity constraints are the following βi values: β1 = 0 , β2 = 0.25 , β3 =
0.17 , β4 = 0.58.
2.4. Summary of Results
If the innovation is drastic, i.e., that it would totally replace the existing product in
that product line, then the firms would: (i) diversify into the incumbent’s product
line only and in the process switch markets as monopolists if and only if picij ≤ ciu <
cid ; (ii) upgrade in own product line and diversify into the competitor’s product line
and compete as Cournot competitors by adopting the innovations in both product
lines if and only if ciu < cid < picij : and (iii) use a mixed strategy equilibrium in
deciding which innovation(s) they would adopt if and only if, ciu < picij < cid .
Under the first type of equilibrium with “drastic” innovation we find that firms
diversify their product lines by crossing over markets and totally replace the in-
cumbents, if payoffs from the competitive outcome are non-positive (i.e., if the
innovations are high cost) for both the entrant and for the incumbent. This type of
equilibrium where the monopolists switch markets develops as a dominant ‘defen-
sive’ strategy because under drastic innovation firms do not undertake adoptions in
their own product lines, since it would only mean replacing themselves as incum-
bents. It can be concluded that, because competition reduces profits, each firm’s
incentive to become a monopolist is greater than its incentive to become a duopolist
by jointly adopting the high cost innovation.
Under the second type of equilibrium, firms upgrade products not only in their
own product line but also in the incumbent’s product line. This type of total di-
versification arises when competitive payoffs from diversifying into the competitor’s
product line is non-negative, i.e., when the innovations are low cost.
We also observe that under some boundary values of cost of adoption and
Cournot profits, firms may use mixed strategy equilibrium. We get mixed strat-
egy equilibrium with drastic innovation if the profits from Cournot competition in
any market strictly cover the cost of adoption for the incumbent, but are strictly less
than the cost of adoption for the entrant, i.e., if the innovations are medium cost.
Both innovations are adopted, however, either through switching of incumbency, or
by the incumbent itself, or by joint adoption in both product lines, as demonstrated
with a numerical example.
The main tendency is that if the firms are facing drastic innovations, then they
would either diversify into the incumbent’s product line only, or upgrade and di-
versify into both product lines. An interesting observation is that, lacking such a
technological rivalry, monopolist firms would not undertake adoptions in their own
product lines, since it would mean replacing themselves as incumbents. Thus, the
outcome of this technological rivalry is socially desirable, since maximum product
diversity is achieved through adoption of new innovations. On the other hand, the
optimal “cooperative” strategy from the firms’ standpoint would be not adopting
the drastic innovations and sticking with the old product. Yet, this strategy can not
be enforced as a credible commitment.
3. Non-drastic Innovation Under Perfect Information
With non-drastic innovation (or partial replacement of the old market) we mean
that successful adoption of the innovation: (i) suppresses the demand for the old
product but does not make it completely obsolete, and (ii) generates new demand
so that the total demand in that product line is growing. In this model, up to 4
product markets (2 in each product line) can coexist in the second period. If both
innovations are adopted exclusively, either by the incumbent or by the entrant,
the payoff that can be earned from each new product market is V mi The costs of
adoption, suppressed in V mi , are ci where cid > ciu , for all i=1,2.
The profits incumbent firms earn from their respective old markets, if the inno-
vation is adopted, are denoted by a parameter ri, where 0 < ri ≤ pimi . ri = 0 would
imply a drastic innovation where the old product market is totally replaced by the
new one. On the other hand, ri = pimi implies that adoption of the innovation has
no effect on the old product market. While this is an extreme case of non-drastic
innovation, no replacement indicates that the two products are possibly unrelated
or not considered to be on the same product line on the demand side.
I modify the notation used for drastic innovations to simplify the characteri-
zation of the model.
The pure strategies for firm i are denoted by:
The pure strategies of firm i are denoted by:
si1 : no action (stick with the existing product)
si2 : upgrade only (adopt the innovation in own product line, and continue produc-
ing the old product if r > 0 .
si3 : diversify only (adopt the innovation in the competitor’s product line)
si4 : upgrade and diversify (adopt both innovations, and continue producing the
old product if r > 0.
Payoffs to firm i are denoted by:
pimi : pre-innovation monopoly profits in own market i (when firm i sticks with its
old product and no upgrading has taken place )
picij : Cournot profits of firm i when both firms jointly adopt the innovation in
market j
ri : post-innovation monopoly profits the incumbent earns from its old product
market i, (requires upgrading by the incumbent and/or diversification through
adoption of an innovation by the competitor into market i)
V mid : monopoly profits in other market j, (requires i to adopt an innovation that
allows it to diversify into market j, but the incumbent does not upgrade)
V miu : profits from having the monopoly of the new product in own market i, (re-
quires i to adopt an innovation that allows it to upgrade its product)
V ciu : profits from the new product in own market i when product is upgraded but
competitor has diversified and entered market i
V cid : profits in other market j when i has diversified by adopting an innovation but
incumbent has upgraded.
Note that the following set of restrictions (i) through (iii), defined in section 2
before and repeated below for convenience is coupled with (iv). These are based on
reasonable assumptions some of which follow directly from the economic theory.
pimij > 2pi
c
ij ∀ i, j = 1, 2 (i)
cid > ciu ∀ i, j = 1, 2 (ii)
V miu , V
m
id > 0 ∀ i, j = 1, 2 (iii)
0 ≤ r ≤ pim. (iv)
Recall that (i) states that the total of Cournot profits any firm can earn in two
separate markets is strictly less than the monopoly profits it can earn in a single
market. Hence, monopoly is always a preferred status by both firms.
Equation (ii) states that the cost of adopting the innovation in any firm’s prod-
uct line is strictly less than the cost of adopting the innovation in the competitor’s
product line capturing the idea of comparative cost advantage obtained by being an
established firm in a product line. It implies6 V miu > V
m
id , and V
c
iu > V
c
id ∀ i = 1, 2
meaning ’upgrading to keep monopoly is better than diversifying to obtain monopoly’
for the former, and ’divesifying to compete with an upgraded product is less prof-
itable than upgrading to compete with an entrant that has diversified in the upgraded
product’ for the latter.
Equation (iii) imposes the restriction that payoffs to being a monopolist in any
market are non-negative. If not, it is either too costly for both the entrant and
the incumbent to earn positive profits following an adoption, or it is too costly
only for the entrant to earn positive profits even if it became a monopolist in
the incumbent’s product line. It implies that pim > ciu, cid ∀ i = 1, 2. If the
inequality holds for the incumbent (V miu > 0), but not for the entrant (V
m
id < 0),
then, under drastic innovation (r = 0) there would be no reason for the incumbent
to adopt the innovation in its own product line since it would be replacing itself as a
monopolist (V miu = pi
m). Thus, this restriction not only eliminates a trivial case but
also captures the idea of technological closeness and rivalry. When (iii) holds, firms
find themselves within the technological boundaries of one another; hence, they see
themselves as potential challengers and entrants in the incumbent’s product line.
Note that (ii) and (iii) together imply the following: First, upgrading to obtain
monopoly is better than diversifying into another market to obtain monopoly, V miu >
V mid ∀ i = 1, 2.
Second, diversifying to compete with an upgraded product is less profitable than
upgrading to compete with an entrant that has diversified in the upgraded product,
V ciu > V
c
id ∀ i = 1, 2.
Inequality (iv) captures the degree of replacement of the old product market
by the adopted innovation. A drastic innovation where the old product market is
totally replaced by the new one will be denoted by r = 0. On the other hand, r = pim
implies that adoption of the innovation has no effect on the old product market since
the incumbent can earn the same amount of profits from its old product market.
While this is an extreme case of drastic innovation, no replacement indicates that
the two products are possibly unrelated.
6 However, it should be noted that Eq.(ii) does not imply either c1u > c2u , or c1d > c2d
, or both necessarily hold.
Finally, note that using Equation (iv), together with (ii) and (iii) we require:
V mid + r > pi
m ∀ i = 1, 2 & 0 ≤ r ≤ pim.
Hence, for a drastic innovation where r = 0, we require that V miu , V
m
id > pi
m.
This defines the lower bound for profits so that the firms would not be worse off
as monopolists if they considered upgrading and/or diversifying their product lines.
I assume equal replacement in the two product lines, i.e., r1 = r2, without loss of
generality, to simplify the notation, as this does not change the results.
Assume V miu +ri > pi
m
i as a proxy that the total demand following adoption of an
innovation in a product line is growing 7 Next assume V miu > V
m
id upgrading to obtain
a monopoly is better than diversifying into another market to obtain monopoly.
Finally, assume V ciu > V
c
id, diversifying to compete with an upgraded product is less
profitable than upgrading to compete with an entrant that has diversified in the
upgraded product.
Table 2 depicts the normal form representation of the general model. For exam-
ple, if the firms exclusively adopt the innovations in their own product lines, the
strategy combination for firm 1 and firm 2 would be denoted by (s2, s2), respectively.
In this case, each firm maintains its monopoly position for both the old and the
new markets in its product line. This strategy yields payoffs of pii(s2, s2) = V miu + ri
and it is the maximum that can be earned as a monopolist in a single product line.
The strategy combination (s4, s4) means that the firms both adopt the innovations
in their product lines and across product lines while continuing to produce their
original products. Thus, the firms become Cournot competitors in the new product
markets and maintain their monopoly positions in the old product markets which
is suppressed by the new products. In this case, payoffs to firm 1 and firm 2, in
respective order, are as follows.
pi1(s4, s4) = V c1u + V
c
1d + r1;pi2(s4, s4) = V
c
2u + V
c
2d + r2.
Similar to the case of drastic innovations, differences in the cost of upgrading
and diversification result in three separate cases to consider under this scenario also.
Case 1 : picij < ciu < cid , ∀ i,j = 1,2 {V ciu < 0 ; V cid < 0}
Case 2 : ciu < cid < picij , ∀ i,j = 1,2 {V ciu > 0 ; V cidA > 0}
Case 3 : ciu ≤ picij ≤ cid , ∀ i,j = 1,2 {V ciu ≥ 0 ; V cid ≤ 0}
I label the above cases as high cost, low cost and medium cost respectively.
3.1. High Cost Non-drastic Innovations
If competitive payoffs to both the incumbent firm and the entrant firm following a
joint adoption of an innovation in any market are strictly negative, I call them high
cost innovations: 8 (V ciu < 0 ; V
c
id < 0) .
7 V miu + ri = pi
m
i , implies the innovation is non-drastic, but it has simply generated new
demand and revenues enough to compensate exactly for the cost of its adoption.
8 Recall that high cost innovations were defined as (V ciu ≤ 0 ; V cid < 0) earlier. I ignore the
discrepancy for the boundary values around zero and use the same terminology for both
situations. This difference arises as a consequence of our concern for classifying types of
innovations according to the outcomes they lead to in the solution of the game.
Firm 1
Firm 2
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11
pim11
pim22
pim11
V m2u + r
r
pim11 + V
m
2d
r
V m2u + V
m
2d + r
s12
V m1u + r
pim22
V m1u + r
V m2u + r
V c1u + r
pim22 + V
c
2d
V c1u + r
V m2u + V
m
2d + r
s13
pim11 + V
m
1d
r
pim11 + V
c
1d
V c2u + r
V m1d + r
V m2d + r
V c1d + r
V c2u + V
m
2d + r
s14
V m1u + V
m
1d + r
r
V m1u + V
c
1d + r
V c2u + r
V c1u + V
m
1d + r
V c2d + r
V c1u + V
c
1d + r
V c2u + V
c
2d + r
Table 2. Strategic game with non-drastic innovations under perfect information.
Lemma 3. Suppose picij < ciu < cid , (V
c
iu , V
c
id < 0) i = j. Then,
(a) pi1(s1, s4) > pi1(s, s4) and pi2(s1, s4) > pi2(s1, s)∀ s.
(b) pi1(s2, s2) > pi1(s, s2) and pi2(s2, s2) > pi2(s2, s)∀ s.
(c) pi1(s3, s3) > pi1(s, s3) and pi2(s3, s3) > pi2(s3, s)∀ s.
(d) pi1(s4, s1) > pi1(s, s1) and pi2(s4, s1) > pi2(s4, s)∀ s.
where pii(sk, sl) is i”s payoff when firm 1 chooses sk and firm 2 chooses sl.
Proposition 5. Under high-cost non-drastic innovation where picij < ciu < cid, the
pure strategy NEP’s are the strategy combinations {s1, s4}, {s1, s2}, {s3, s3}, and
{s4, s1} with payoffs (r1; V m2u + V m2d + r2), (V m1u + r1; V m2u + r2), (V m1d + r1; V m2d + r2),
and (V m1u + V
m
1d + r1; r2) respectively.
Remark 4. Under two of the four equilibria, and , we observe a passive incumbent
and an aggressive entrant. The entrant monopolist diversifies across both its own
product line and the entrant’s product line, whereas the incumbent sticks with the
old product and is partly preyed upon and replaced by the aggressive entrant. In
the other two equilibria, and , both firms are actively involved in diversification and
specialization process. In the former equilibrium, firms stay in their own market and
upgrade in their own product lines. In the latter equilibrium, they diversify only in
the incumbent’s product line; and in this process of switching, they partly replace
the incumbent and are partly replaced by the entrant in their old markets.
Example: pimi = 10 , ciu = 4 , cid = 5 , V
m
iu = 6 , V
m
id = 5 , V
c
iu = −1 , V cid =
−2 , r1 = r2 = 6. It is a fairly easy exercise to plug in the values above into the
generalized normal form given in table 2 and see that {s1, s4},{s2, s2},{s3, s3}, and
{s4, s1} are the NEP’s with corresponding payoffs of (6,17), (12,12), (11,11), and
(17,6) respectively. r1 and r2, are given equal values to make the payoffs symmetric.
Their equality is not necessary to drive the results.
Firm 1
Firm 2
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11 10 , 10 10 , 12 6 , 15 6 , 17
∗
s12 12 , 10 12 , 12
∗ 5 , 8 5 , 8
s13 15 , 6 8 , 5 11 , 11
∗ 4 , 10
s14 17 , 6
∗ 10 , 5 10 , 4 3 , 3
Example
Fig. 4. High cost non-drastic innovations.
Lemma 4. Suppose ciu ≤ picij ∀ i, j = 1, 2 {V ciu ≥ 0}. Then,
(a) pi1(s2, s) ≥ pi1(s1, s) and pi2(s, s2) ≥ pi2(s, s1) ∀ s
(b) pi1(s4, s) ≥ pi1(s3, s) and pi2(s, s4) ≥ pi2(s, s3) ∀ s
where pii(sk, sl) is i’s payoff when firm 1 chooses sk and firm 2 chooses sl.
3.2. Low Cost Non-drastic Innovations
I classify the non-drastic innovations as low cost if the competitive payoffs the
entrant and the incumbent would separately earn in any market following a joint
adoption of an innovation are strictly positive (V ciu > 0 , V
c
id > 0).
Proposition 6. Under low-cost non-drastic innovations where ciu < cid < picij,
{Vciu > 0 ; Vcid > 0} the NEP is the strategy combination {s4, s4} with payoffs (Vc1u+
Vc1d + r1 ; V
c
2u + V
c
2d + r2). Thus, each monopolist upgrades both in its own product
line and diversifies into the competitor’s product line while keeping the monopoly
position in the old product market which is partly replaced by the innovation.
Remark 5. Since innovations are non-drastic each firm stays as a monopolist in
the old product market and also guarantees a non-negative payoff by upgrading
its own product even if the competitor diversifies. On the other hand, diversifying
also yields a non-negative competitive payoff. Thus, each monopolist successfully
enters the incumbent’s market. Although the incumbent can not prevent entry, it
avoids being partly preyed upon by the entrant, through upgrading its own product.
Monopoly is replaced by competition in both of the new product markets since each
monopolist both upgrades its own product line and diversifies into the competitor’s
product line. However, each firm maintains the monopoly position in the old product
market which, in part, is replaced by the innovation. The costly diversification may
be justified for the presumably lower prices that would result under competition.
Example : pimi = 10 , ciu = 2 , cid = 3 , V
m
iu = 8 , V
m
id = 7 , V
c
iu = 2 , V
c
id =
1 , r1 = r2 = 6.
Firm 1
Firm 2
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11 10 , 10 10 , 14 6 , 17 6 , 21
s12 14 , 10 14 , 14 8 , 11 8 , 15
s13 17 , 6 11 , 8 13 , 13 7 , 15
s14 21 , 6 15 , 8 15 , 7 9 , 9
∗
Example
Fig. 5. Low cost non-drastic innovations.
When the above values are inserted into the generalized normal form given in
table 2 we see that the NEP is {s4, s4}, and the corresponding payoffs are (9,9).
3.3. Medium Cost Non-drastic Innovations
Medium cost innovations are defined such that competition with an upgraded prod-
uct is profitable (V ciu ≥ 0) but diversifying to compete with an upgraded product is
not (V cid ≤ 0).
Proposition 7. Under medium-cost non-drastic innovation where ciu ≤ picij ≤
cid {Vciu > 0 ; Vcid > 0}, the NEP is the strategy combination {s2, s2} with payoffs
(Vm1u+ r1 ; V
m
2u+ r2). Thus, the monopolists stay in their product lines and upgrade
their own products.
Remark 6. Since innovations are non-drastic each firm stays as a monopolist in
the old product market and also guarantees a non-negative payoff by upgrading
its own product even if the competitor diversifies. On the other hand, diversifying
yields a non-positive competitive payoff. Thus, each incumbent effectively prevents
entry by adopting only those innovations in its own product line and maintains its
monopoly position. This is the optimal outcome from both the firms’ and the soci-
ety’s standpoint. Both innovations are undertaken by the low cost firms established
in those product lines. The threat of an incumbent prevents costly diversification
which is desirable. Yet, both innovations are adopted through low cost upgrading
by the incumbent firms which maintain their monopoly positions in their respective
product lines.
Example: pimi = 10 , ciu = 3 , cid = 5 , V
m
iu = 7 , V
m
id = 5 , V
c
iu = 1 , V
c
id =
−1 , r1 = r2 = 6
Firm 1
Firm 2
s21 s22 s23 s24
s11 10 , 10 10 , 13 6 , 15 6 , 18
s12 13 , 10 13 , 13
∗ 7 , 9 7 , 12
s13 15 , 6 9 , 7 11 , 11 5 , 12
s14 18 , 6 12 , 7 12 , 5 6 , 6
Example
Fig. 6. Medium cost non-drastic innovations.
A simple inspection upon plugging the values above into table 2 shows that
(s2, s2) is the NEP, with the corresponding payoffs of (13,13).
3.4. Summary of Results
If the innovation is (i) non-drastic and high cost type, then the firms would find
themselves in a multiple equilibria in pure strategies which ranges from sticking
with their status quo to diversifying across both product lines; if the innovation is
(ii) non-drastic and low cost type, they would upgrade and diversify across both
product lines by adopting both of the innovations; and finally if the innovation is
(iii) non-drastic and medium cost type, they would upgrade in their own product
lines and maintain their monopoly positions.
Multiple equilibria arises with non-drastic innovation if competitive payoffs of
both the entrant and the incumbent are strictly negative (picij<ciu < cid); in other
words if the innovations are high cost type. Under this scenario a multiplicity of
best reply strategies for each monopolist range from adopting both innovations, to
not adopting any of the innovations. Both innovations are adopted, however, under
any of the possible Nash equilibria. An interesting point is that, under two of the
four possible equilibria, we observe a passive incumbent and an aggressive entrant.
The entrant monopolist diversifies across both its own product line and the entrant’s
product line, whereas the incumbent sticks with the old product and is partly preyed
upon and replaced by the aggressive entrant. In the other two multiple equilibria
both firms are actively involved in diversification and specialization process. In one
of the equilibrium, firms stay in their own market and diversify in their own product
lines. In the other equilibrium, they diversify only in the incumbent’s product line;
and in this process of switching, they partly replace the incumbent and are partly
replaced by the entrant in their old markets.
Under the second type of equilibrium with low cost innovations, firms upgrade
products not only in their own product line but also in the incumbent’s product line.
This type of total diversification arises when competitive payoffs from diversifying
into the competitor’s product line is non-negative (ciu < cid < picij). This latter
result is obtained under both the drastic and non-drastic low cost innovations.
Under the third type of Nash equilibrium, monopolists stay in their own markets
and increase their specialization and upgrading of existing products. We get this
result under Nash equilibrium with medium cost non-drastic innovations (ciu ≤
picij ≤ cid), i.e., when the cost of diversifying in another product line exceeds the
flow profits of a possible competitive outcome.
The main tendency is that if the firms are facing non-drastic innovations, then,
they would either upgrade in their own product lines only, or upgrade and diversify
into both product lines. Unlike the case of drastic innovation, firms do have the
incentive to upgrade their own products even without the technological rivalry. The
existence of a potential threat of entry into the incumbent’s product line enhances
the process of diversification and the firms might find themselves with excessive
diversification across all possible product lines within their technological reach. The
optimal outcome from both the society’s and the firms’ standpoints dictates that
the firms adopt innovations in their own product lines since the same maximum
product diversity could be achieved by the least cost monopolist. However, not only
that this can not be enforced as a credible commitment, but it would also imply that
the incumbents’ monopoly positions would have to remain unchallenged. Clearly,
this process of strategic inventiveness is in accord with the Schumpeterian concept
of “creative destruction”.
4. A Model of Innovation Adoption under Asymmetric Information
Next I turn to an asymmetric information scenario. Asymmetry means that one of
the firms has access to private information which the other firm does not, and can
be justified by historical leadership of a firm in R&D activity and other reputation
effects. Hence, the informed firm is recognized and its leadership is accepted, giving
it the first-mover advantage. Yet, the resulting signal about its private information
would enable the uninformed firm to form conjectures, update its prior beliefs and
make assessments.
In this section I work with the non-drastic innovation case and consider the
drastic innovation as a special case. (Refer to Table 2. for the generalized normal
form game.)
Payoffs are as defined in the base model of section 3. I shall, however, suppress
the first subscript of the above notation when writing the payoffs under different
strategy combinations. For example, the payoff to firm 2 under s12 and s22 strategy
combinations will be denoted by pi2(s2, s2) = V m2u + r, and the strategy combination
(s4, s4) now means that the firms adopt the innovations both in their product lines
(upgrading) and across product lines (diversifying) while continuing to produce the
old products. Thus, the firms become Cournot competitors in the new product
markets and maintain their monopoly position in the -now suppressed-old product
markets. In this case, the payoffs to firm 1 and firm 2, in respective order, are as
follows:
pi1(s4, s4) = V c1u + V
c
2d + r
pi2(s4, s4) = V c2u + V
c
2d + r
Next, recall that there are types of the players determined by 3 possible cost
structures defined with respect to the competitive payoffs of each firm. I identify
each cost structure with a possible firm type, denoted by Nij(jthtype of firm i).
These firm types are given as follows:
(i) Ni1 : V ciu ≤ 0, V cid < 0 (pic ≤ ciu < cid)
(ii) Ni2 : V ciu > 0, V
c
id < 0 (ciu < pi
c < cid)
(iii) Ni3 : V ciu > 0, V
c
id ≥ 0 (ciu < cid ≤ pic)
From the incumbent’s point of view, the competitor’s type is an indicator of
whether it is a low cost, medium cost, or a high cost entrant. From the entrant’s
point of view, the incumbent’s type is an indicator of whether it would fight back to
block entry, accommodate the entrant and share the new product market, or yield
the monopoly position in its product line.
Suppose, firm 1 has private information about his own type and that of firm
2, but firm 2 does not.–throughout this paper we shall assume that firm 1 is the
informed player, and first mover. Firm 1 observes both its own type (N1j) and its
competitor’s type (N2j).
Firm 2, on the other hand, knows only the adoption costs in its own product
line,c2u , which enables it to conclude whether V c2u ≤ 0 or V c2u > 0. If, in fact, c2uis
too high such that V c2u ≤ 0, then it follows that V c2u < 0since by initial condition(ii)
we have c2u < c2d. This enables firm 2 to conclude that his type is (N21). Firm 2
does not need additional information to decide whether its type is (N21)or not.
When firm 2 is of type (N21), her best reply to the strategy played by firm 1
is based on only the information that she is a high cost firm. On the other hand,
firm 2 has imperfect information about firm 1’s type. Firm 2 knows that firm 1 is
the informed player and has complete information about the types of both firms.
This information advantage enables firm 1 to be the first mover regardless of his
own type, and firm 2 accepts its leadership.
Lemma 5. For the uninformed firm, its best reply to s11is given as follows:
s24 = b2(s11) ∀ N2j , j = 1, 2, 3.
Proof (of lemma). From Table 1 we immediately see that,
pi2(s1, s4 | N2j)− pi2(s1, s3 | N2j) = (V m2u + V m2d + r)− pim + V m2d )
= V m2u + r − pim ≥ 0
pi2(s1, s4 | N2j)− pi2(s1, s2 | N2j) = (V m2u + V m2d + r)− (V m2u + r)
= V m2u > 0
pi2(s1, s4 | N2j)− pi2(s1, s1 | N2j) = (V m2u + V m2d + r)− (pim)
= (V m2u + r − pim) + V m2d > 0 uunionsq
We denote firm 2’s best reply to the strategy s played by firm 1 by b2(s):
b2(s) = arg max
s′
pi2 pi2(s, s′)
Then, a Stackelberg equilibrium is a pair of strategies (s∗, b2(s∗)) such that,
s∗ = arg max
s
pi1 (s∗, b2(s∗)).
Next, the following lemma is used to construct normalized strategies of firm 2
as a function of her type, N2j
Lemma 6. For the uninformed firm, its best replies given that it knows its type,
are given as follows:
(a) s22 = b2(s12) iff N2 = N21, N22
s24 = b2(s12) iff N2 = N23
(b) s23 = b2(s13) iff N2 = N21
s24 = b2(s13) iff N2 = N22, N23
(c) s21 = b2(s14) iff N2 = N21
s22 = b2(s14) iff N2 = N22
s24 = b2(s14) iff N2 = N23.
Table 3 summarizes firm 2’s best reply strategies as a function of her type and
the corresponding payoffs to both firms.
Firm 1′s
Leader Strategy
F irm2′s
Best Reply
F irm 1′s
Payoff
F irm 2′s
Payoff
s1 s4 r V
m
2u + V
m
2d + r
s2 s2, if V
c
2d < 0
s4, if V
c
2d > 0
V m1u + r
V c1u + r
V m2u + r
V m2u + V
c
2d + r
s3 s3, if V
c
2u < 0
s4, if V
c
2u ≥ 0
V m1u + r
V c1d + r
V m2d + r
V c2u + V
m
2d + r
s4 s1, if V
c
2u < 0, V
c
2d < 0
s2, if V
c
2u > 0, V
c
2d < 0
s4, if V
c
2u > 0, V
c
2d > 0
V m1u + V
m
1d + r
V m1u + V
c
1d + r
V c1u + V
c
1d + r
r
V c2u + r
V c2u + V
c
2d + r.
Table 3. Stackelberg equilibria and payoffs under perfect information.
Lemma 7. For the informed firm, the following payoff dominance relationships
hold if the uninformed firm is of type N2J {J = 2, 3 }
(a)
(a) pi1(s2, s2 | N11) > pi1(sk, s2 | N11) ∀ k = 1, 3, 4
pi1(s1, s4 | N11) > pi1(sk, s4 | N11) ∀ k = 2, 3, 4
(b) pi1(s2, s2 | N12) > pi1(s, s2 | N12)
pi1(s2, s4 | N12) > pi1(s, s4 | N12)
(c) pi1(s4, s2 | N13) > pi1(s, s2 | N13)
pi1(s1, s4 | N13) > pi1(s, s4 | N13)
4.1. Stackelberg Equilibria
It should be noted that only in the case where firm 1 leads by playing its s11strategy,
is firm 2’s best reply not a function of its type; i.e., firm 2 does not need to know
its type to play its best reply strategy, s24. Consequently we can write the following
proposition.
Proposition 8. If firm 1 has perfect information, then (s4, s1) is a Stackelberg
equilibrium if and only if firm 2’s type is N21.
Proof (of proposition).
Proposition 8 can be easily proved by inspecting Table 2 :
If (s4, s1) is a Stackelberg equilibrium, then from the last part of table 3, s1 =
b2(s4) if V c2u > 0, V
c
1d < 0, i.e., firm 2 s type is N21. Conversely, suppose firm 2’s
type isN21. .
Then, consider each strategy of firm 1:
s4 = b2(s1)⇒ pi1(s1, b2(s1)) = r
s2 = b2(s2)⇒ pi1(s2, b2(s2)) = V m1u + r
s3 = b2(s3)⇒ pi1(s3, b2(s3)) = V m1u + r
s1 = b2(s4)⇒ pi1(s4, b2(s4)) = V m1u + V m1d + r
From this we see that s4 = arg maxs pi1(s, b2(s)) and s1 = b2(s4).
Thus, (s4, s1)is a Stackelberg equilibrium. uunionsq
Remark 7. Under (N11, N21), (N12, N21)and(N13, N21) the uninformed player can
deduce that it is a high cost firm without further information or signaling by firm 1,
the informed player. Under the above states of the world, firm 2 need not know which
type of a competitor (high cost/medium cost/low cost) it is facing. Firm 2’s best
response solely depends on its own type,N21. Firm 1 benefits from its information
advantage only because it is the first mover. An interesting aspect of the NEP is
that it is determined without any reference to the leader’s type. Firm 1 might be a
high cost or medium cost firm(N11orN12). But this is irrelevant for the particular
NEP obtained, as long as firm 1 is the first mover. Firm 1 uses the first mover
advantage; it upgrades and diversifies to obtain monopoly position in both the old
and the new product markets. Firm 2, on the other hand, continues to produce the
old product and exploits the residual demand as a declining monopolist.
Proposition 9. The following strategy combinations obtain under the following
states of the world9 when firm 1 is the Stackelberg leader, and firm 2 is the follower.
If (N11, N22), then the Stackelberg equilibrium is (s2, s2);
If (N12, N22), then the Stackelberg equilibrium is (s2, s2);
If (N13, N22), then the Stackelberg equilibrium is (s4, s2);
If (N11, N23), then the Stackelberg equilibrium is (s1, s4);
If (N12, N23), then the Stackelberg equilibrium is (s2, s4);
If (N13, N23), then the Stackelberg equilibrium is (s4, s4);
Proof. Analogous to the proof of Proposition 8 as it is seen from Table 3.
9 A State of the World is defined as the occurrence of a combination of the types of two
firms such that (N1i, N2j) i, j = 1, 2, 3.
4.2. Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium with a medium/low cost follower
The Solution Concept:
To firm 2, firm 2 is either type N22 or N23; firm 1 can be any of N11,N12,N13.
Being uninformed, firm 2 assigns prior probabilities Pr(N22) = φ, Pr(N23) =
1−φ; Pr(N11) = θ1; Pr(N12) = θ2; and Pr(N13) = θ3, φ ≥ 0, θj ≥ 0, θ1+θ2+θ3 =1
These prior beliefs are common knowledge, i.e., they are known to both firms.
Firm 2 knows that firm 1 knows her prior beliefs, and firm 1knows that firm 2 knows
that he knows her beliefs, and so on. Firm 2 has to update its beliefs after observing
certain strategies played by firm 1.
Suppose for example, that firm 2 observes s12 being played by firm 1. Her type
might be either N22 or N23. Seeing s12 should make firm 2 update the posterior
belief, Pr(N22 | s12) . The natural method is to use Bayes’s rule, which shows how
to revise the prior belief in the light of data. It uses two pieces of information
that firm 2 knows: the likelihood of seeing s12 given that the state of the world
is N22, Pr(s12 | N22), and the likelihood ofs12 given that the state of the world
is, N23, Pr(s12 | N23). Since there are only 2 alternatives to firm 2’s type, the
marginal likelihood of seeings12 as a result of one or another possible types of
firm 2, (N22 or N23) is given by,
Pr(s12) = Pr(s12 |N22) Pr(N22) + Pr(s12 |N23) Pr(N23).
The probability that both the strategy s12 played and the state of the world N22
occurs is:
Pr(s12, N22) = Pr(s12 |N22) Pr(N22)
= Pr(N22 | s12) Pr(s12)
Firm 2’s new belief -its posterior- is calculated using Pr(s12), which yields the
following Bayes Rule.
Pr(N22 | s12) = Pr(s12 |N22) Pr(N22)Pr(s12)
The term Bayesian equilibrium is used to refer to Nash equilibrium when players
update their beliefs according to Bayes’s rule (Rasmussen, 1989). Perfect Bayesian
equilibrium point (PBEP) is a Stackelberg equilibrium (s*, β2(s∗)) where β2(s∗)is
the Bayesian best reply to to s* such that ,
β2(s) = arg max
s′
pi2Epi2(s, s′)
s∗ = arg max
s′
pi1 (s, β2(s))
4.3. Characterization of Equilibrium
The main focus of this section is Theorem 2. Its proof shall be accomplished in a
series of lemmas and observations in Appendix 2.
Theorem 2. Under asymmetric, imperfect and incomplete information where firm
1 is the informed player and where the states of the world are (N1j , N2l), ∀ =
1, 2, 3, l = 2, 3, the perfect Bayesian equilibrium points are the following strategy
combinations:
(a) : (s1, s4) iff (−) (V
c
2d |,N22)
(V c2d |,N23) ≤
θ2(1−φ)
(θ1+θ2)φ
and N1 = N11
(b) : (s2, s4) iff (−) (V
c
2d |,N22)
(V c2d |,N23) ≤
θ2(1−φ)
(θ1+θ2)φ
and N1 = N12
(c) : (s4, s4) iff (−) (V
c
2d |,N22)
(V c2d |,N23) ≤
(1−φ)
φ and N1 = N13
(d) : (s2, s2) iff (−) (V
c
2d |,N22)
(V c2d |,N23) ≥
θ2(1−φ)
(θ1+θ2)φ
and N1 = N11, N12
(e) : (s4, s2) iff (−) (V
c
2d |,N22)
(V c2d |,N23) ≤
(1−φ)
φ and N1 = N13
First, recall from weak dominance firm 2’s dominant strategies are
s22 and s24when it is either medium or low cost (see table 4.2). Hence, firm 1
effectively faces a normal form game of dimension (4x2) if firm 2 is of either N22 or
N23 type (see Table 4. for the reduced normal form).
Firm 1
Firm 2
s22 s24
s11 pi
m
11 , V
m
2u + r r , V
m
2u + V
m
2d + r
s12 V
m
1u + r , V
m
2u + r V
c
1u + r , V
m
2u + V
m
2d + r
s13 pi
m
11 + V
c
1d , V
c
2u + r V
c
1d + r , V
c
2u + V
m
2d + r
s14 V
m
1u + V
c
1d + r , V
c
2u + r V
c
1u + V
c
1d + r , V
c
2u + V
c
2d + r
Table 4. Reduced strategic game with non-drastic innovations under imperfect informa-
tion.
I assume that firm 1, being an informed player, will always strive to reach the
Stackelberg equilibrium that corresponds with its observed state. This assumption
allows us to derive firm 2’s conjectures of observing a strategys1kconditional on her
type N2j , i.e., Pr(s1k |N2j) ∀ J = 2, 3 & k = 1, ..., 4.
Lemma 8. For the uninformed firm the following conjectures hold.
(a) : Pr(s11, N22) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s11 |N1i, N22) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s11 |N11, N22) Pr(N11) + Pr(s11 |N12, N22) Pr(N12)
+ Pr(s11 |N13, N22) Pr(N13)
= 0
Pr(s11, N23) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s11 |N1i, N23) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s11 |N11, N23) Pr(N11) + Pr(s11 |N12, N23) Pr(N12)
+ Pr(s11 |N13, N23) Pr(N13)
= Pr(N11) = θ1
(b) : Pr(s12, N22) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s12 |N1i, N22) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s12 |N11, N22) Pr(N11) + Pr(s12 |N12, N22) Pr(N12)
+ Pr(s12 |N13, N22) Pr(N13)
= Pr(N11) + Pr(N12) = θ1 + θ2
Pr(s12, N23) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s12 |N1i, N23) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s12 |N11;N23) Pr(N11) + Pr(s12 |N12, N23) Pr(N12)
+ Pr(s12 |N13, N23) Pr(N13)
= Pr(N12) = θ2
(c) : Pr(s14, N22) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s12 |N1i, N22) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s14 |N11, N22) Pr(N11) + Pr(s14 |N12, N22) Pr(N12)
+ Pr(s14 |N13, N22) Pr(N13)
= Pr(N13) = θ3
Pr(s14, N23) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s14 |N1i, N23) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s14 |N11, N23) Pr(N11) + Pr(s14 |N12, N23) Pr(N12)
+ Pr(s14 |N13, N23) Pr(N13)
= Pr(N13) = θ3
Remark on Separating and Pooling Equilibria:
Suppose part (d) of Theorem 2 holds, so that firm 2’s best reply to s12 is s22 We
note that under (d) firm 1 can be either a high cost type or a medium cost type.
Clearly, by deciding on a best reply of s22 under (d) firm 2 can not differentiate
between the two types of competitors.
From lemma 7(b), recall that a medium cost firm 1’s best reply to either s22 or
s24 is s12. From lemma 7(a), also recall that a high cost type firm 1’s best reply to
s22 is also s12. This indicates that under (d) an informed high cost firm successfully
pretends that it is medium cost type. Under (d) we obtain a pooling equilibrium.
Next, suppose (a) holds. Notice that (a) is a perfectly symmetric condition to
(d). In this case, firm 2’s best reply to s12is s24 . But (a) holds only if firm 1 is
high cost type so that his best reply to s24 is s11. In this case, a high cost firm
1 is successfully differentiated from a medium cost one. Under (a) we obtain a
separating equilibrium.
Rational Priors at a Boundary Payoff : V cid = 0
Recall that a firm is defined as medium cost -type Ni2− if V ciu > 0 and V
c
id < 0
hold; and it is defined as low cost-type Ni3− if V ciu > 0 and V
c
id ≥ 0 hold. Hence,
note that the lower bounds of V cid under the two types are given by the following
equations:
(V cid |Ni2) = −cid
(V cid |Ni3) = 0
Corollary 1. Suppose the uninformed firm’s competitive payoff is given by, (V cid |N23) =
0. Then, a separating equilibrium is obtained if and only if the following priors hold:
1− φ = 1,and/or θ3 = 1
Proof. Suppose firm 2 observes s12. Then, from the proof of Theorem 2 part (b) we
note that firm 2’s best reply to s12 is s24 if and only if:
0 ≤ θ2(1− φ)(V c2d |N23) + (θ1 + θ2)φ(V c2d |N22)
Substituting (V c2d |N23) = 0, into the above equation we obtain,
0 ≤ (θ1 + θ2)φ(V c2d |N11, N22). (14)
But, since (V c2d |N22) < 0 then, we require either θ1+θ2 = 0 , and/or φ =
0 for (14) to hold. Hence, it is easily seen that:
1− φ = 1, and/or θ3 = 1. uunionsq
Remark 8. If (V c2d |N23) then from theorem 2(b) we require (14) to hold for a
separating equilibrium (s2, s4). But, it is immediate that if there is a slight deviation
in the priors so that the reverse inequality to (14) holds then, we obtain the condition
in part(d) which gives s22 as a Bayesian best reply to s12. Therefore, a pooling
equilibrium shall be obtained under part (d). Obviously, firm 2 would prefer a
separating equilibrium to a pooling equilibrium as opposed to firm 1 who would
rather have a pooling equilibrium. This clearly requires (14) to hold, enabling firm
2 to derive the range of her rational priors as defined in the corollary.
4.4. A Proposed Equilibrium Using “Equally Likely” Assumption
A reasonable way to form priors for firm 2 is to conjecture that her type being N22
or N23 is equally likely (conditioned on not observing N21), Pr(N22) =Pr(N23) =0.5
Further, suppose that she conjectures her facing a competitor of type N11, N12
or N13 is also equally likely, Pr(N11) =Pr(N12) =Pr(N13) =0.333 .
Based on these common priors, firm 2 would update her beliefs. Accordingly,
using the conjecture equations from lemma 8, firm 1 would play s12 66.7 percent
of the time, and play s14 33.3 percent of the time, when firm 2’s type is N22.
Hence, firm 2’s conjecture upon observing s12 would be Pr(s11 |N22) = 0.667 and
Pr(s14 |N22) = 0.333.
Similarly when firm 2’s type is N23, firm 1 would plays11, s12 and s1433.3 percent
of the time, leading to conjectures Pr(s11 |N23) =Pr(s12 |N23) =Pr(s14 |N23) =
0.333
Suppose firm 1 plays his s12 strategy. Recall that this situation is characterized
under parts (b) and (d) of theorem 2. Firm 2 would update her beliefs using her
priors and Bayes’s rule upon observing s12. Then, we have:
Pr(N22 | s12) = { Pr(s12 |N22) }φ{ Pr(s12 |N22) }φ+ {Pr(s12 |N23) } (1− φ) .
Substituting the conjectures,
=
(θ1 + θ2)φ
(θ1 + θ2)φ+ θ2(1− φ)
and finally, substituting the values of priors,
Pr(N22 | s12) = (0.667)(0.5)(0.667)(0.5) + (0.333)(0.5) = 0.667.
Also,
Pr(N23 | s12) = 1− Pr(N22 | s12) = 1− 0.667 = 0.333
Thus, using the notation of theorem 2 we obtain,
θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
=
0.333
0.667
= 0.5
Hence, from the theorem 2, part (d) if the condition (−) (V c2d |N1i,N22)(V c2d |N1i,N23) ≥ 0.5
holds, then firm 2’s equilibrium strategy upon observing s22 is to play s22.
On the other hand, if, instead, firm 2’s conjectures satisfy part (b) of theorem
2, such that (−) (V c2d |N1i,N22)(V c2d |N1i,N23) ≤ 0.5 holds, then firm 2’s best reply to s12 is s24.
Next, suppose firm 1 plays his s14 strategy. This situation is characterized under
parts (c) and (e) of theorem 2. Firm 2’s updated beliefs would be,
Pr(N22 | s12) = { Pr(s12 |N22) }φ{ Pr(s12 |N22) }φ+ {Pr(s12 |N23) } (1− φ)
substituting the conjectures we have,
=
(θ1 + θ2)φ
(θ1 + θ2)φ+ θ2(1− φ) .
Finally, substituting the values of priors we obtain,
Pr(N22 | s12) = (0.667)(0.5)(0.667)(0.5) + (0.333)(0.5) = 0.667
and,
Pr(N22 | s12) = 1− Pr(N22 | s12) = 1− 0.667 = 0.333.
Thus, using the notation of theorem 2 we obtain,
=
θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
=
0.333
0.667
= 0.5
Hence, from the theorem 1, part (d) if the condition (−) (V c2d |N1i,N22)(V c2d |N1i,N23) ≥ 0.5 holds,
firm 2’s equilibrium strategy upon observing s22 is to play s22.
On the other hand, if, instead, firm 2’s conjectures satisfy part (b) of theorem
2, such that (−) (V c2d |N1i,N22)(V c2d |N1i,N23) ≤ 0.5 holds, then firm 2’s best reply to s12 is s24.
Next, suppose firm 1 plays his s14strategy. This situation is characterized under
parts (c) and (e) of theorem 2. Firm 2’s updated beliefs would be,
Pr(N22 | s14) = { Pr(s14 |N22) }φ{ Pr(s14 |N22) }φ+ {Pr(s14 |N23) } (1− φ) .
Substituting the conjectures,
=
θ3φ
θ3φ+ θ3(1− φ)
And finally, substituting the values of priors we get:
Pr(N22 | s14) = (0.333)(0.5)(0.333)(0.5) + (0.333)(0.5) = 0.5.
It follows that,
Pr(N23 | s14) = 1− Pr(N22 | s14) = 1− 0.5 = 0.5
Substituting the notation of theorem 2 we obtain,
=
(1− φ)
φ
=
0.5
0.5
= 1
Hence, from the theorem 2, part (e) if the condition (−) (V c2d |N1i,N22)(V c2d |N1i,N23) ≥ 1 holds,
upon observing s14, firm 2’s equilibrium strategy is to play s22. Also, from the-
orem 1, part (c) if the condition (−) (V c2d |N1i,N22)(V c2d |N1i,N23) ≤ 1 holds, then upon observing
s14firm 2’s equilibrium strategy is to play s24. On the other hand firm 1’s best reply
does no depend on firm 2’s strategy since under type N13 his best reply to boths22
and s24 is to play s14. Nevertheless, the equilibrium (s4, s2)under (e) is preferred to
the equilibrium (s4, s4) under (c) by firm 1, since it yields higher payoffs (see table
2).
Last, suppose firm 1 playss11 , then from lemma 5 we know that firm 2’s best
reply is to play s24. But, this does not suffice for (s1, s4) to be a perfect Bayesian
equilibrium, as I have argued in the proof of theorem 2. We check for the binding
condition which causes s11 to be firm 1’s equilibrium strategy.
Pr(N22 | s12) = { Pr(s12 |N22) }φ{ Pr(s12 |N22) }φ+ {Pr(s12 |N23) } (1− φ)
Substituting for the values of the priors, and the “passive conjectures” we get,
Pr(N22 | s12) = (0.667)(0.5)(0.667)(0.5) + (0.333)(0.5) = 0.667,
also,
Pr(N22 | s12) = 1− Pr(N22 | s12) = 1− 0.667 = 0.333.
Substituting the notation of theorem 2 we obtain,
=
θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
=
0.333
0.667
= 0.5
Hence, we get the condition (a), (−) (V c2d |N1i,N22)(V c2d |N1i,N23) < 0.5 for (s1, s4) to be an
equilibrium strategy combination. That is, firm 1 decides to play his best reply
strategy ofs11, only after being certain that firm 2’s Bayesian best reply to s12 is
s24. In return, firm 2’s best reply to s11 is s24. Firm 2 does not require to update her
beliefs about her own type in order to decide on a best reply strategy, since from
lemma 5 we know that s24 is her best reply under both N22 and N23. In this case,
firm 1 successfully recognizes a high cost competitor and we obtain a separating
equilibrium (s1, s4) under (a)
Thus, proposed priors and the “passive conjectures” support the set of perfect
Bayesian equilibria characterized in theorem 2.
4.5. Concluding Remarks
It is most likely and plausible to define the initial conditions for an interior solution,
i.e., that for a low-cost firm competitive payoff from diversification would be strictly
positive, whereas for a high-cost firm it would be strictly negative. Hence, the unin-
formed firm will have to form prior beliefs unconstrained by any rationality criteria
which is discussed in the corollary. Theorem 2 allows us to make comparative static
conjectures about the likelihood of certain equilibrium outcomes with respect to a
change in the uninformed firm’s prior beliefs.
Suppose firm 1 is considering to play s1 strategy, knowing from theorem 2
That firm 2’s best reply is s4. Then, he is more likely to play s1 the higher is
firm 2’s prior belief that she is a low-cost firm, ceteris paribus. Also, he is more
likely to play s1 the higher is firm 1’s prior belief that she is facing a medium-
cost competitor, ceteris paribus, thereby attaining the (s1, s4) equilibrium strategy
combination. Hence, the higher are the values of 1−φand/or θ2are, the more likely
it is to obtain a separating equilibrium. If the likelihood of firm 2’s prior beliefs
is such that she strongly believes she is a high-cost firm and that she is facing
either a high-cost and/or medium-cost competitor, then the more likely is it that
the equilibrium outcome would be (s1, s4) supporting a pooling equilibrium, ceteris
paribus.
An interesting observation is that it is less likely for a high-cost firm to exploit
his information advantage against an optimistic firm 2 who strongly believes that
she is a low-cost type, ceteris paribus. With an optimistic firm 2 and a high cost
firm 1 it is more likely to observe (s1, s4) than it is to observe (s2, s2). On the other
hand a pessimistic firm 2 can be more easily forced to stay in her product line by a
high cost firm 1 who would stay in his product line himself. In this case we observe
that firm 1 would be forced to maintain his monopoly position by upgrading his
product line even though it would have been less costly for firm 2 to do so if she
had chosen to diversify.
Another important observation on this point is that the efficiency choice from
the society’s standpoint is not one between having monopoly or competition, but
it is one between a high-cost monopolist (firm 1) and a low-cost monopolist (firm
2). Hence, from an efficiency standpoint the society is losing from firm 2’s igno-
rance, and more so if she does not have an optimistic outlook. This, possibly, is a
supportive argument for having government research labs (or joint research projects
coordinated by government institutions, like the MITI in Japan) provide and/or co-
ordinate the flow of scientific information across companies which will enable them
assess their potential strengths and weaknesses.
Next, suppose firm 1 plays his s4 strategy. We know from theorem 2 that firm 1
would do so only when he is a low-cost firm. In other words, firm 1 would stick to
s4 if he is low -cost, no matter what firm 2’s prior beliefs are. Firm 2’s response, in
this case, is a function of her prior beliefs about her own type only. She will tend to
play s4 the higher are her prior beliefs that she is a low-cost firm, enabling her to
upgrade and diversify into both markets following her competitor, ceteris paribus.
This requires firm 2 to be optimistic about her own type, whereas firm 1 would
prefer her to be pessimistic and stick to her product line.
Hence, it is more likely to get a competitive outcome (s4, s4)in both markets the
more optimistic firm 2 is about her own type. On the other hand, it is more likely
that a pessimistic firm 2 would lose her monopoly position in her product line by
sharing it with firm 1, while firm 1continues to be a monopolist in his product line.
From an efficiency standpoint, the choice is between having monopoly or compe-
tition in firm 1’s product line. Since with a more optimistic firm 2 we tend to have
competition in both markets, then, policies that encourage firm 2 to increase her
optimism about diversification should be devised. Such policies would possibly pro-
vide additional incentives that would enable downgrading of the uninformed firm’s
prior beliefs about the costs of diversification.
5. Conclusion
This paper has investigated strategic behavior of technologically progressive mo-
nopolist firms facing a choice of upgrading or diversifying their product lines by
adopting product innovations which embody increasing composition of technology.
The analysis starts with formalizing a set of plausible assumptions of the basic
game theoretical model at the beginning of each chapter. First, the case of perfect
information is taken up under drastic innovations. The assumptions of symmetry
in payoffs and no market growth enabled us to focus on the role of pure strategic
behavior on the part of the incumbent and the entrant firms considering adoption of
innovations. Using the competitive payoffs as a benchmark for classifying the type
of innovations, the Nash equilibrium points (NEP’s) are characterized under three
separate cases.
Under the first type of equilibrium with drastic innovation we find the inter-
esting possibility that firms diversify their product lines by crossing over markets
and totally replace the incumbents, if the innovations are high cost. This type of
equilibrium where the monopolists switch markets develops as a dominant ‘defen-
sive’ strategy because under drastic innovation firms do not undertake adoptions in
their own product lines, since it would mean replacing themselves as incumbents. It
can be concluded that, because competition reduces profits, each firm’s incentive to
become a monopolist is greater than its incentive to become a duopolist by jointly
adopting the high cost innovation.
We also observe that under some boundary values of cost of adoption and
Cournot profits, firms may use mixed strategy equilibrium. We get this type of equi-
librium with medium cost drastic innovations. We characterize the range of mixed
strategy equilibria using a theorem. Both innovations are adopted, however, either
through switching of incumbency, or by the incumbent itself, or by joint adoption
in both product lines, as we have demonstrated with a numerical example.
Under the third type of equilibrium, firms upgrade products not only in their
own product line but also in the incumbent’s product line. This type of total diver-
sification arises when the innovations are low cost.
The main tendency is that if the firms are facing drastic innovations, then,
they would either diversify into the incumbent’s product line only, or upgrade and
diversify into both product lines. An interesting observation is that, lacking such a
technological rivalry, monopolist firms would not undertake adoptions in their own
product lines, since it would mean replacing themselves as incumbents. Thus, the
outcome of this technological rivalry is socially desirable, since maximum product
diversity is achieved through new innovations. On the other hand, the optimal
‘cooperative’ strategy from the firms’ standpoint would be not adopting the drastic
innovations and sticking with the old product. Yet, this strategy can not be enforced
as a credible commitment.
The basic model is later modified to the case of non-drastic innovations. The
assumption of symmetry in payoffs is relaxed by allowing differential market growth
in separate product lines. The model is shown to yield equilibria where product
upgrading is the more often preferred best reply strategy. High cost non-drastic
innovations is shown to exhibit multiple equilibria. Under this scenario a multiplicity
of best reply strategies for each monopolist range from adopting both innovations, to
not adopting any of the innovations. Both innovations are adopted, however, under
any of the possible Nash equilibria. An interesting point is that, under two of the
four possible equilibria, we observe a passive incumbent and an aggressive entrant.
The entrant monopolist diversifies across both its own product line and the entrant’s
product line, whereas the incumbent sticks with the old product and is partly preyed
upon and replaced by the aggressive entrant. In the other two multiple equilibria
both firms are actively involved in diversification and specialization process. In one
of the equilibrium, firms stay in their own market and diversify in their own product
lines. In the other equilibrium, they diversify only in the incumbent’s product line;
and in this process of switching , they partly replace the incumbent and be partly
replaced by the entrant in their old markets.
Under the second type of Nash equilibrium, monopolists stay in their own mar-
kets and increase their specialization and upgrading of existing products. We get
this result under Nash equilibrium with medium cost non-drastic innovations, i.e.,
when the cost of diversifying in another product line exceeds the flow profits of a
possible competitive outcome.
Under the third type of equilibrium with low cost innovations, firms upgrade
products not only in their own product line but also in the incumbent’s product
line. This latter result is obtained under both the drastic and non-drastic low cost
innovations.
The main tendency under non-drastic innovations is found to be either upgrad-
ing in own product line only, or upgrading and diversifying into both product lines.
Unlike the case of drastic innovation, firms do have the incentive to upgrade their
own products even without the technological rivalry. The existence of a potential
threat of entry into the incumbent’s product line enhances the process of diversi-
fication and the firms might find themselves with excessive diversification across
all attainable product lines. The optimal outcome from both the society’s and the
firms’ standpoints dictates that the firms adopt innovations in their own product
lines since the same maximum product diversity could be achieved by the least cost
monopolist. However, not only that this can not be enforced as a credible com-
mitment, but it would also imply that the incumbents’ monopoly positions would
have to remain unchallenged. When put together, these models imply a process of
strategic inventiveness that is in accord with the Schumpeterian concept of “creative
destruction”.
Finally, the perfect information framework is extended to the case of asymmetric
information. Three separate types are defined for each player. It is shown that if the
uninformed firm is a high cost type, then, Stackelberg equilibrium is the appropriate
equilibrium concept. Under a low or a medium cost type follower, perfect Bayesian
equilibria are characterized using a theorem. It is shown that equilibrium requires
the uninformed firm should derive assessments which are best replies to the strategy
chosen by the informed firm in response.
Following this, it is argued that the prior beliefs of the uninformed firm can sup-
port two different types of equilibrium. Under pessimistic prior beliefs, the outcome
will be a pooling equilibrium in which the uninformed firm can not differentiate
between a high cost competitor from a medium cost one. This allows a high cost
informed firm to successfully pretend that it is a medium cost type. Alternatively,
it is less likely for a high cost firm to exploit his information advantage against
an optimistic firm who has strong prior beliefs that she is a low cost type, leading
to a separating equilibrium. Exploiting the information advantage under a pooling
equilibrium implies that a low cost uninformed firm would be forced to stay in her
product line by a high cost informed firm who would stay in his product line him-
self. In this case we also observed that a high cost informed firm would be forced to
maintain his monopoly position by upgrading his product line even though it would
have been less costly for the uninformed firm to do so if she had chosen to diversify.
An important observation on this point is that the efficiency choice from the
society’s standpoint is not one between having monopoly or competition, but it is
one between a high-cost monopolist (the informed firm ) and a low-cost monopolist
(the uninformed firm). Hence, from an efficiency standpoint the society is losing
from not only the uninformed firm’s ignorance, but also from her pessimistic out-
look. This, possibly, is a supportive argument for a centrally coordinated industrial
policy that is augmented by government research labs (or joint research projects
coordinated by government institutions) providing and/or coordinating the flow of
scientific information across companies which will enable them assess their potential
strengths and weaknesses.
Hence, it is argued that a competitive outcome in both markets is more likely the
more optimistic the uninformed firm is about her own type. On the other hand, it
is more likely that a pessimistic uninformed firm would lose her monopoly position
in her product line by sharing it with the informed firm, while he continues to be a
monopolist in his product line.
From an efficiency standpoint, since with a more optimistic ignorance we tend
to have competition in both markets, then, policies that encourage the uninformed
firm to increase her optimism about diversification should be devised. Such policies
would possibly provide additional incentives that would enable downgrading of the
uninformed firm’s prior beliefs about the costs of diversification.
The range of rational prior beliefs for a boundary payoff value of a low cost
follower is characterized under a corollary. It is shown that these priors are the
necessary conditions that satisfy the criteria for a separating equilibrium. Finally,
an example of sensible equilibrium is presented using passive conjectures under
‘equally likely’ assumption.
An obviously restrictive assumption of the models in this paper is that only 2
incumbent firms seeking diversification were allowed to be challengers to each other
and choose between only two innovations to adopt under certainty. While introduc-
ing more firms and more innovations would complicate the analysis, it is our belief
that the qualitative results would not change. However, an intriguing extension for
future research would be to explore the equilibrium under post adoption market
uncertainty. An adoption will be either a success or a failure10 with a two point
probability distribution. Uncertainty of a successful adoption might be another fac-
tor why firms want to diversify across markets. Finally, although the simple model
in this paper provides some insights about the relationship of technological close-
ness and market structure, it is but a small step towards understanding the more
complex dynamic process where market structure evolves with increasing product
diversity, and where incumbent firms identify their potential competitors and try to
enhance their comparative advantages in the basic research of their product lines.
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10 Glazer (1985) considers possibility of entry and failure in this sense and gives a brief
summary of the empirical literature on product failures,
Appendix
1. First Appendix
Proof (of Lemma 1). From Table 1 we immediately see that, pi1(s1, s1) > pi1(s2, s1),
pi1(s1, s2) > pi1(s2, s2), pi1(s1, s3) ≥ pi1(s2, s3) and pi1(s1, s4) ≥ pi1(s2, s4). Therefore,
pi1(s3, s) ≥ pi1(s4, s) ∀ s. Similarly, pi2(s, s1) ≥ pi2(s, s2) ∀ s. From Table 1
we see that, pi1(s3, s1) − pi1(s4, s1) = c1u > 0,pi1(s3, s2) − pi1(s4, s2) = c1u > 0,
pi1(s3, s3)− pi1(s4, s3) = −V c1u ≥ 0
and pi1(s3, s4) − pi1(s4, s4) = −V c1u ≥ 0. Therefore, pi1(s3, s) ≥ pi1(s4, s) ∀ s.
Similarly, by symmetry we obtain pi2(s, s3) ≥ pi2(s, s4) ∀ s. uunionsq
Proof (of proposition 1). From Lemma 1. we can replace the original game by the
(2× 2) game with the dominant strategies s1 and s3 for each firm. Notice that the
resulting reduced game represents a ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ situation. Firms play their
maximin strategies in order to avoid the worst outcome of being totally preyed upon
by their competitors. Hence, the NEP is the strategy combination (s3, s3). uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 2). From Table 1 we see that, pi1(s3, s1) − pi1(s1, s1) =V m1d > 0;
pi1(s3, s1)− pi1(s1, s2) =V c1d ≥ 0; pi1(s3, s3)− pi1(s1, s3) =V m1d > 0, and
pi1(s3, s4) − pi1(s1, s4) =V c1d ≥ 0. Therefore, pi1(s3, s) ≥ pi1(s1, s) ∀ s. Similarly,
pi2(s, s3) ≥ pi2(s, s1) ∀ s. From Table 1 we see that, pi1(s4, s1)−pi1(s2, s1) =V m1d > 0,
pi1(s4, s2) − pi1(s2, s2) =V c1d ≥ 0, pi1(s4, s3) − pi1(s2, s3) =V m1d > 0, and pi1(s4, s4) −
pi1(s2, s4) =V c1d ≥ 0. Therefore, pi1(s4, s) ≥ pi1(s2, s) ∀ s. Similarly, by symmetry
we obtain pi2(s, s3) ≥ pi2(s, s1) ∀ s. uunionsq
Proof (of proposition 2). From Lemma 2 we can replace the original game by the
(2× 2) reduced game with the dominant strategies s2 and s4 for each firm. Notice
that this reduced game represents a “prisoner’s dilemma” situation. Hence, the only
self-enforcing and stable strategy combination is (s4, s4) which is the only NEP. uunionsq
Proof (of proposition 3). To prove (1) it is sufficient to show that (β1+β3)V m1d+(β2+
β4)V c1d can not be either strictly positive or strictly negative in a Nash Equilibrium.
Case 1. : Suppose
(β1 + β3)V m1d + (β2 + β4)V
c
1d > 0 (i)
Then, upon inspection of the expression for E1(α, β) above, it is immediate that
firm 1’s best reply to β such that (i) holds must satisfy α1 = 0 , α2 = 0. Then
E2(α, β) becomes:
E2(α, β) = β2(α3+α4)V
c
2u+β3{α3V
m
2d+α4V
c
2d}+β4{α3V
m
2d+α4V
c
2d+(α3+α4)V
c
2u}
(ii)
If β is firm 2’s best reply, it will maximize (ii) given α. If α3V
m
2d + α4V
c
2d > 0,
then a best reply β will consist of β1 = 0, β2 > 0, β3 = 0, β4 > 0. But these
values of β contradict (i). If α3V
m
2d + α4V
c
2d < 0, then a best reply β will consist of
β1 = 0, β2 = 0, β3 = 0, β4 = 0. But these values of β also contradict (i). Finally,
if α3V
m
2d + α4V
c
2d = 0, then, a best reply β will consist of β1 = 0, β2 > 0, β3 = 0,
β4 > 0, which again contradicts (i). Therefore, no NEP can exist which satisfies (i).
Case 2. : Suppose,
(β1 + β3)V
m
1d + (β2 + β4)V
c
1d < 0 (iii)
Upon inspection of E1(α, β) above, the inequality (iii) implies that firm 1’s best
reply must satisfy α3 = 0, α4 = 0. This implies that E2(α, β) becomes:
E2(α, β) = β1(α1 + α2)pim22 + β2(α1 + α2)V
m
2u + β3{(α1 + α2)pim22 + α1V
m
2d + α2V
c
2d}
+ β4(α1 + α2)V m2u + α1V
m
2d + α2V
c
2d} (iv)
A best reply for firm 2 will maximize (iv) given α. Since pim22 > V
m
2u , then, β2 = 0
and β4 = 0. But then (iii) can never hold when β2 = 0 , β4 = 0. Therefore, it follows
that (iii) cannot hold under a NEP.
This proves that under a NEP, (1) must be true. Clearly, by symmetry, it follows
that under a NEP, (2) must also be true. uunionsq
Proof (of proposition 4). We first prove (4). Substituting 1) from Proposition 3 into
E1(α, β) we get:
E1(α, β) = α1(β1 + β2)pim11 + α2{(β1 + β2)V m1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u}
+ α3(β1 + β2)pim11 + α4{(β1 + β2)V m1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u}. (i)
We will prove that, (β1 + β2)pim11 = (β1 + β2)V
m
1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u is impossible.
First, consider the inequality,
(β1 + β2)pim11 > (β1 + β2)V
m
1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u. (ii)
But, maximizing (i) under (ii) implies that firm 1’s best reply must satisfy
α1 > 0, α3 > 0, α2 = 0, α4 = 0. But this strategy violates Proposition 3-2. Hence,
(ii) can not hold in a Nash Equilibrium.
Next, consider the inequality,
(β1 + β2)pim11 < (β1 + β2)V
m
1u + (β3 + β4)V
c
1u . (iii)
Maximizing (i) under (iii) implies that firm 1’s best reply must satisfy α1 = 0,
α2 > 0, α3 = 0, α4 > 0. This also contradicts Proposition 3-2. Thus, we conclude
that (4) must hold under a Nash Equilibrium. By symmetry we can write the
expected payoff of firm 2 using Proposition 3-2 as follows:
E2(α, β) = β1(α1 + α2)pim22 + β2{(α1 + α2)V m2u + (α3 + α4)V
c
2u}
+ β3(α1 + α2)pim22 + β4{(α1 + α2)V m2u + (α3 + α4)V
c
2u (iv)
In a symmetric manner it is easy to see that a NEP that maximizes (iv) requires
that (3) hold. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 3). From Table 2 we immediately see that,
pi2(s1, s4)− pi2(s1, s3) = (V m2u + V m2d + r2)− (pim2 + V m2d)
= (V m2u + r2 − pim2 ) > 0.
pi2(s1, s4)− pi2(s1, s2) = (V m2u + V m2d + r2)− (V m2u + r2)
= V m2d > 0.
pi2(s1, s4)− pi2(s1, s1) = (V m2u + V m2d + r2)− (pim2 )
= (V m2u + r2 − pim2 ) + V m2d > 0.
From Table 2 we see that,
pi1(s1, s4)− pi1(s2, s4) = r1 − (V c1u + r1) = −V c1u > 0.
pi1(s1, s4)− pi1(s3, s4) = r1 − (V c1d + r1) = −V c1d > 0.
pi1(s1, s4)− pi1(s4, s4) = r1 − (V c1u + V c1d + r)
= −(V c1u + V c1d) > 0.
This proves (a).
From Table 2 we see that,
pi2(s2, s2)− pi2(s2, s1) = (V m2u + r2)− pim2 > 0.
pi2(s2, s2)− pi2(s2, s3) = (V m2u + r2)− (V c2d + pim2 )
= (V m2u + r2 − pim2 )− V c2d > 0.
pi2(s2, s2)− pi2(s2, s4) = (V m2u + r2)− (V m2u + V c2d + r2) = −V c2d > 0
Similarly, from symmetry we see that, pi1(s2, s2)− pi1(s, s2) > 0 ∀ s.
This proves (b).
From Table 2 we see that,
pi2(s3, s3)− pi2(s3, s1) = (V m2d + r2)− r2 = V m2d > 0
pi2(s3, s3)− pi2(s3, s2) = (V m2d + r2)− (V c2u + r2) = V m2d − V c2d > 0
pi2(s3, s3)− pi2(s3, s4) = (V m2d + r2)− (V c2u + V m2d + r2) = −V c2u > 0
Similarly, from symmetry it is immediate that, pi1(s3, s3)− pi1(s, s3) > 0 ∀ s.
This proves (c).
Also note from Table 2 that the strategy combination (s4, s1) implied by (d) is
symmetrically opposite to the strategy combination (s1, s4) implied by (a). To prove
(d) it is sufficient to see that the payoffs are also distributed symmetrically. Hence,
using (a) we get, pi1(s4, s1) − pi1(s, s1) > 0 ∀ s and pi2(s4, s1) − pi2(s4, s) > 0 ∀ s.
This proves (d). uunionsq
Proof (of proposition 5). Suppose firm 1 plays its s1 strategy. Then, firm 2’s best
reply strategy is s4. Since from Lemma 3 (a) we have, pi2(s1, s4) > pi2(s1, s) ∀ s.
Alternately, suppose firm 2 plays its s4 strategy. Then, firm 1’s best reply strategy
is s1. Since from Lemma 3 (a) we have, pi1(s1, s4) > pi1(s, s4) ∀ s. Hence, {s1, s4}
is a NEP.
Suppose firm 1 plays its s2 strategy. Then, firm 2’s best reply strategy is s2.
Since from Lemma 3 (b) we have, pi2(s2, s2) > pi2(s2, s) ∀ s. Alternately, suppose
firm 2 plays its s2 strategy. Then, firm 1’s best reply strategy is s2. Since from
Lemma 3 (b) we have, pi1(s2, s2) > pi1(s, s2) ∀ s. Hence, {s2, s2} is another NEP.
Suppose firm 1 plays its s3 strategy. Then, firm 2’s best reply strategy is s3.
Since from Lemma 3 (c) we have, pi2(s3, s3) > pi2(s3, s) ∀ s. Alternately, suppose
firm 2 plays its s3 strategy. Then, firm 1’s best reply strategy is s3. Since from
Lemma 3 (c) we have, pi1(s3, s3) > pi1(s, s3) ∀ s. Hence, {s3, s3} is another NEP.
Suppose firm 1 plays its s4 strategy. Then, firm 2’s best reply strategy is s1. Since
from Lemma 3 (d) we have, pi2(s4, s1) > pi2(s4, s) ∀ s. Alternately, suppose firm 2
plays its s1 strategy. Then, firm 1’s best reply strategy is s4. Since from Lemma 3
(d) we have, pi1(s4, s1) > pi1(s, s1) ∀ s. Hence, {s4, s1} is another NEP. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 4). From Table 2. we immediately see that, pi1(s2, s1) > pi1(s1, s1),
pi1(s2, s2) > pi1(s1, s2), pi1(s2, s3) ≥ pi1(s1, s3) and pi1(s2, s4) ≥ pi1(s1, s4). Therefore,
pi1(s2, s) ≥ pi1(s1, s) ∀ s. Similarly, pi2(s, s2) ≥ pi2(s, s1) ∀ s.
From Table 3 we see that, pi1(s4, s1) > pi1(s3, s1) , pi1(s4, s2) > pi1(s3, s2),
pi1(s4, s3) ≥ pi1(s3, s3) and pi1(s4, s4) ≥ pi1(s3, s4). Therefore, pi1(s4, s) ≥ pi1(s3, s)∀ s.
Similarly, by symmetry we obtain,pi2(s, s4) ≥ pi2(s, s3)∀ s. uunionsq
Proof (of proposition 6). From Lemma 4. we can replace the original game by the
reduced form (2 × 2) game with the dominant strategies s2 and s4 for each firm.
Notice that the resulting reduced game can be further iterated for payoff dominance.
From Table 2 it is immediate that, pi1(s4, s2)−pi1(s2, s2) = V c1d > 0 and pi1(s4, s4)−
pi1(s2, s4) = V c1d > 0. Therefore, pi1(s4, s) > pi1(s2, s) ∀ s. Similarly, pi2(s, s4) >
pi2(s, s2) ∀ s. Hence, NEP is the strategy combination (s4, s4). uunionsq
Proof (of proposition 7). From Lemma 4. we can replace the original game 3. by
the (2× 2) game with the dominant strategies s2 and s4 for each firm. Notice that
the resulting reduced game can be further iterated for payoff dominance. To see this
note from Table 2. that, pi1(s2, s2)− pi1(s4, s2) = V c1d ≤ 0, pi1(s2, s4)− pi1(s4, s4) =
V c1d ≤ 0. Therefore, pi1(s2, s) ≥ pi1(s4, s) ∀ s. Similarly, pi2(s, s2) ≥ pi2(s, s4) ∀ s.
Hence, the NEP is the strategy combination {s2, s2}. uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 6). From Table 1 we immediately see that,
pi2(s2, s2 | N2j)− pi2(s2, s1 | N2j) = V m2u + r + pim > 0
pi2(s2, s2 | N2j)− pi2(s2, s3 | N2j) = (V m2u + r + pim)− V d2c > 0
pi2(s2, s2 | N2j)− pi2(s2, s4 | N2j) = −V c2d > 0 ∀ j = 1, 2.
And,
pi2(s2, s4 | N23)− pi2(s2, s1 | N23) = V m2u + r − pim + V c2d > 0
pi2(s2, s4 | N23)− pi2(s2, s2 | N23) = V c2d ≥ 0
pi2(s2, s4 | N23)− pi2(s2, s3 | N23) = V m2u + r − pim > 0
This proves (a).
From table 1. we see that,
pi2(s3, s3 | N21)− pi2(s3, s1 | N21) = V m2d > 0
pi2(s3, s3 | N21)− pi2(s3, s2 | N21) = V m2d − V c2d > 0
pi2(s3, s3 | N21)− pi2(s3, s4 | N21) = −V C2u ≥ 0
pi2(s3, s4 | N2j)− pi2(s3, s1 | N2j) = V C2u + V m2d > 0
pi2(s3, s4 | N2j)− pi2(s3, s2 | N2j) = V m2d > 0
pi2(s3, s4 | N2j)− pi2(s3, s3 | N2j) = V C2u ≥ 0 ∀ j = 2, 3
This proves (b).
From Table 1 we immediately see that,
pi2(s4, s1 | N21)− pi2(s4, s2 | N21) = −V C2u ≥ 0
pi2(s4, s1 | N21)− pi2(s4, s3 | N21) = −V C2d > 0
pi2(s4, s1 | N21)− pi2(s4, s4 | N21) = −(V c2u + V C2d) > 0
We also see that,
pi2(s4, s2 | N22)− pi2(s4, s1 | N22) = −V C2u > 0
pi2(s4, s2 | N22)− pi2(s4, s3 | N22) = V C2u − V cd > 0
pi2(s4, s2 | N22)− pi2(s4, s4 | N22) = −V C2d > 0
and,
pi2(s4, s4 | N23)− pi2(s4, s1 | N23) = V c2u + V C2d > 0
pi2(s4, s4 | N23)− pi2(s4, s2 | N23) = V C2d ≥ 0
pi2(s4, s4 | N23)− pi2(s4, s3 | N23) = V c2u > 0
This proves (c). uunionsq
Proof (of Lemma 7). From Table 3 we note that,
pi1(s2, s2 | N11)− pi1(s1, s2 | N11) = (V m1u + r)− pim > 0
pi1(s2, s2 | N11)− pi1(s3, s2 | N11) = (V m1u + r)− (pi + V c1d)
= (V m1u + r − pim)− V c1d > 0
pi1(s2, s2 | N11)− pi1(s4, s2 | N11) = (V m1u + r)− (V m1u + V c1d + r) = −V c1d > 0
We also note that,
pi1(s1, s4 | N11)− pi1(s2, s4 | N11) = r − (V c1u + r) = −V c1u > 0
pi1(s1, s4 | N11)− pi1(s3, s4 | N11) = r − (V c1d + r) = −V c1d > 0
pi1(s1, s4 | N11)− pi1(s4, s4 | N11) = r − (V c1u + V c1d + r)
= −(V c1u + V c1d) > 0
This proves (a).
From Table 3 we see that,
pi1(s2, s2 | N12)− pi1(s1, s2 | N12) = (V m1u + r)− pim > 0
pi1(s2, s2 | N12)− pi1(s1, s2 | N12) = (V m1u + r)− (pim + V c1d)
= (V m1u + r − pim)− V c1d) > 0
pi1(s2, s2 | N12)− pi1(s4, s2 | N12) = (V m1u + r)− (V m1u + V c1d + r)
= −V c1d > 0
We also note that,
pi1(s2, s4 | N12)− pi1(s1, s4 | N12) = (V c1u + r)− r > 0
pi1(s2, s4 | N12)− pi1(s3, s4 | N12) = (V c1u + r)− (V c1d + r)
= V c1u − V c1d > 0
pi1(s2, s4 | N12)− pi1(s4, s4 | N12) = (V c1u + r)− (V c1u + V c1d + r)
= −V c1d > 0
This proves (b).
From Table 3 we see that,
pi1(s4, s2 | N13)− pi1(s1, s2 | N13) = (V m1u + V c1d + r)− pim > 0
pi1(s4, s2 | N13)− pi1(s2, s2 | N13) = (V m1u + V c1d + r)− (V m1u + r) = V c1d > 0
= (V m1u + r − pim) > 0
We also note that,
pi1(s4, s4 | N13)− pi1(s1, s4 | N13) = (V c1u + V c1d + r)− r > 0
pi1(s4, s4 | N13)− pi1(s2, s4 | N13) = (V c1u + V c1d + r)− (V c1u + r)
= V c1d > 0
pi1(s4, s4 | N13)− pi1(s3, s4 | N13) = (V c1u + V c1d + r)− (V c1d + r)
= V c1d > 0
This proves (c).
Proof (of Lemma 8). First, we prove lemma 8(c). Recall from lemma 7(c) that
s14 is the dominant leading strategy if firm 1 is of type N13. Hence, firm 2 uses
the following joint distribution of the states of the world and firm 1’s dominant
strategies to derive her
conjectures, Pr(s1k |N2j)∀j = 2, 3&k = 1, ..., 4. In particular, when strategy s14
observed, then, the following equations must hold.
Pr(s14 |N11, N22) = 0 Pr(s14 |N11, N23) = 0
Pr(s14 |N12, N22) = 0 Pr(s14 |N12, N23) = 0
Pr(s14 |N13, N22) = 1 Pr(s14 |N13, N23) = 1
Therefore, it follows that,
Pr(s14, N22) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s14 |N1i, N22) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s14 |N13;N22) Pr(N13) = Pr(N13) = θ3
and,
Pr(s14, N23) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s14 |N1i, N23) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s14 |N13;N23) Pr(N13) = Pr(N13) = θ3
This proves part (c) of lemma 8.
Also, note that under (N11, N12)the Stackelberg equilibrium is (s1, s2).This al-
lows firm 2 to use the following joint distribution to derive her conjectures.
Pr(s12 |N11, N22) = 1 Pr(s12 |N11, N23) = 0
Pr(s12 |N12, N22) = 1 Pr(s12 |N12, N23) = 1
Pr(s12 |N13, N22) = 0 Pr(s12 |N13, N23) = 0
It follows that,
Pr(s12, N22) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s12 |N1i, N22) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s12 |N11;N22) Pr(N11) + Pr(s12 |N12, N22) Pr(N12)
= Pr(N11) + Pr(N12) = θ1 + θ2
and,
Pr(s12, N23) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s12 |N1i, N23) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s12 |N11;N23) Pr(N12) + Pr(s12 |N13, N23) Pr(N13)
= Pr(N12) = θ2.
This proves part (b) of lemma 8.
Last, we note that (s1, s4)is a Stackelberg equilibrium only if the state of the
world is (N11, N23). In other words, s11 can only be observed if (i) firm 1 is of type
N11 (recall Lemma 7 (a)), and (ii) firm 2 is of type N23 (recall Lemma 6). Hence,
we conclude that if and when s11 is observed the following distribution should hold:
Pr(s11 |N11, N22) = 0 Pr(s11 |N11, N23) = 1
Pr(s11 |N12, N22) = 0 Pr(s11 |N12, N23) = 0
Pr(s11 |N13, N22) = 0 Pr(s11 |N13, N23) = 0
which are used by firm 2 to calculate her conjectures of her type upon observing
s11.
Pr(s11, N22) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s11 |N1i, N22) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s11 |N11, N22) Pr(N11) + Pr(s11 |N12, N22) Pr(N12)
+ Pr(s11 |N13, N22) Pr(N13) = 0
and,
Pr(s11, N23) =
3∑
i=1
Pr(s11 |N1i, N23) Pr(N1i)
= Pr(s11 |N11, N23) Pr(N11) + Pr(s11 |N12, N23) Pr(N12)
+ Pr(s11 |N13, N23) Pr(N13)
= Pr(s11 |N11;N23) Pr(N11) = Pr(N11) = θ1
This proves part (a) of Lemma 8.
2. Second Appendix
Proof (of Theorem 2).
First, we prove (e)
We will prove that s22is a best reply to s14iff
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)|
(V c2d |N23)
≥ (1− φ)
φ
. (1)
Recall from weak dominance that firm 2’s dominant strategies ares22 and s24
under either N22 or N23. Therefore, it follows that s22 is a best reply tos14 if and
only if,
Epi2(s4s2) ≥ Epi2(s4, s4) (2)
where,
Epi2(s4s2) = Pr(N22 | s14)pi2(s4, s2 |N22) + Pr(N23 | s14)pi(s4, s2 |N23.) (3)
Epi2(s4s4) = Pr(N22 | s14)pi2(s4, s4 |N22) + Pr(N23 | s14)pi(s4, s4 |N23.) (4)
We use Bayes’s rule to calculate Pr(N22 | s14) and Pr(N23 | s14):
Pr(N22 | s14) = Pr(s14 |N22) Pr(N22)Pr(s14)
=
{ Pr(s14 |N22) }φ
{ Pr(s14 |N22) }φ+ {Pr(s14 |N23) } (1− φ) (5)
where φand 1− φ are the priors for Pr(N22) and Pr(N23), respectively.
But from Lemma 8(c) we have
Pr(s14 |N22) = Pr(N13) = θ3
Pr(s14 |N23) = Pr(N13) = θ3
which upon substitution into (5) yields:
Pr(N22 | s14) = φ
It follows that,
Pr(N23 | s14) = 1− φ
From Table 2. and the definitions of N22, N23 we observe that:
pi2(s4, s2 | N22) = pi2(s4, s2 | N23) = V c2u + r > 0
and,
pi2(s4, s4 | N2j) = (V c2u |N2j) + (V c2d |N2j) + r
where, (V c2u |N2j) = V c2u > 0 for j = 2, 3
and,
(V c2d |N2j) =
{
V c2d < 0 for j = 2
V c2d ≥ 0 for j = 3
}
Therefore, substituting the expressions for Pr(N2j | s14), pi2(s4, s2 |N2j)
and Ppi2(s4, s2 |N2j), j = 2, 3 into (3) and (4), we can write the inequality
(2) as,
V c2u + r ≥ V c2u + r + (V c2d |N22)φ+ V c2d |N23(1− φ) or,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≥ (1− φ)
φ
What we have shown so far is that s22 is a best reply to s14if and only if the
inequality (1) holds independently of player 1’s type. The arguments also show that
s24 is a best reply to s14 if the reverse inequality to (1) holds independently of player
1’s type.
Next, we will prove that s24is a best reply to s12iff,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≤ θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
(6)
We know from weak dominance that firm 2’s dominant strategies are
s22 and s24 under either N22 orN23 . Therefore, it follows that s24 is a best reply
to s12 if and only if,
Epi2(s4s4) ≥ Epi2(s2, s2) (7)
where,
Epi2(s2s4) = Pr(N22 | s12)pi2(s2, s4 |N22) + Pr(N23 | s12)pi2(s2, s4 |N23) (8)
Epi2(s2s2) = Pr(N22 | s12)pi2(s2, s2 |N22) + Pr(N23 | s12)pi2(s2, s2 |N23) (9)
We use Bayes’s rule to calculate Pr(N22 | s12) and Pr(N23 | s12):
Pr(N22 | s12) = Pr(s12 |N22) Pr(N22)Pr(s12)
=
{Pr(s12 |N22)}φ
{Pr(s12 |N22)}φ+ {Pr(s12 |N23)}(1− φ) (10)
where φ and 1−φ are the priors for Pr(N22) and Pr(N23) respectively. But from
Lemma 8 (b) we have
Pr(s12 |N22) = Pr(N11) + Pr(N12) = θ1 + θ2
Pr(s12 |N23) = Pr(N12) = θ2
which upon substitution into (10) yields:
Pr(N22 | s12) = (θ1 + θ2)φ
θ1φ+ θ2
Then, it follows that,
Pr(N23 | s12) = 1− Pr(N22 | s12)
=
θ2(1− φ)
θ1φ+ θ2
From Table 2. and the definitions of N22, N23 we observe that:
pi2(s2, s4 | N2j) = V m2u + (V c2d |N2j) + r > 0
and,
pi2(s2, s2 | N22) = pi2(s2, s2 | N23) = V m2u + r
where,
(V c2d |N2j) =
{
V c2d < 0 for j = 2
V c2d ≥ 0 for j = 3
}
Therefore, substituting the expressions for Pr(N2j | s12),pi2(s2, s4 | N2j) and
pi2(s2, s2 | N2j), j = 2, 3into (8) and (9), we can write the inequality (7) as
0 ≤ (θ1 + θ2)φ
θ1φ+ θ2
(V c2d |N22) +
θ2(1− φ)
θ1φ+ θ2
(V c2d |N23)
or,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≤ θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
Hence, we have shown that s24 is a best reply to s12if and only if the inequality
(6) holds independently of player 1’s type. The arguments also show that s22 is a
best reply to s12 if and only if the reverse inequality to (6) holds independently of
player 1’s type.
What we have shown so far is s22 = b2(s24) if and only if (1) holds; and s24 =
b2(s12) if and only if (6) holds.
Conversely, suppose (1) holds. Then we know that
s24 6= b2(s14)
.
Similarly, suppose (6) holds. Then we know that
s22 6= b2(s14)
.
To see this we reproduce (1) and (6) below for convenience,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≥ (1− φ)
φ
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≤ θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
It is easily seen that,
θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
≤ (1− φ)
φ
∀0 ≤ θi ≤ 1 (11)
From (11) it is obvious that (1) and (6) can not hold together.
Now, if (s4, s2) is a perfect Bayesian equilibrium point (PBEP), then we know
s22 is a best reply to s14 so that inequality (1) holds. Conversely, suppose (1) holds.
Then we know s22 is a best reply to s14. However, in order for (s4, s2) to be a PBEP
we must have,
pi1(s4, s2) ≥ pi1(si, b2(si)) ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4 where s22 = b2(s14).
Recall that under Lemma 7 s11 , s12 and s14 are identified as best replies to s22
and s24 under N1j for all j = 1, 2, 3. Therefore it follows that s14 is a Bayesian best
reply to s22 if and only if,
(a) pi1(s4, s2) ≥ pi1(s1, s4)
(b) pi1(s4, s2) ≥ pi1(s2, s2) (12)
(c) pi1(s4, s2) ≥ pi1(s2, s4)
But we have shown that s24 6= b2(s12) when (1) holds. Therefore (12.c) drops
out.
From Table 2 and the definitions of N11,N12and N13we observe that,
pi1(s4, s2) = V m1u |V c1d + r ≥=
{
pi1(s1, s4) = r always holds
pi1(s2, s2) = V m1u + r holds if N1 = N13
}
(13)
(s2, s4)is a PBEP iff,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≥ (1− φ)
φ
and N1 = N13.
This proves part (e) of Theorem 2.
If (s2, s4) is a PBEP then we know s24 is a best reply to s12 so that inequality
(6) holds.
Conversely, suppose (6) holds. Then, we know s24 is a best reply to s12. However,
in order for (s2, s4) to be a PBEP we must have
pi1(s2, s4) ≥pi1(si, b2(si)) ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4 where s24 = b2(s12).
Since from Lemma 7 s11, s12, s14 are identified as best replies to s22 and
s24 under N1j for all j = 1, 2, 3, it follows that s12 is a Bayesian best reply to s24 if
and only if,
(a) pi1(s2, s4) ≥ pi1(s1, s4)
(b) pi1(s2, s4) ≥ pi1(s4, s4) (14)
(c) pi1(s2, s4) ≥ pi1(s4, s2)
But we have shown that s22 6= b2(s14) when (6) holds. Therefore, (14.c) drops
out.
From Table 4 and the definitions of N11,N12and N13 we observe that,
pi1(s2, s4) = V c1u + r ≥{
pi1(s1, s4) = r holds if N1 = N12, N13
pi1(s4, s4) = V c1u + V
c
1d + r holds if N1 = N11, N12
}
(15)
(s2, s4)is a PBEP iff,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≥ θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
and N1 = N12 .
This proves part (b) of Theorem 2
.
We have already proved that s22 is a best reply to s12if and only if,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≥ θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
(16)
Thus, (s2, s2)is a PBEP we s22know is a best reply to s12 so that (16) must
hold.
Conversely, suppose (16) holds. Then we know s22 is a best reply to s12. But in
order for (s2, s2) to be a PBEP, we must have,
pi1(s2, s2) ≥pi1(si, b2(si)) ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4 where s22 = b2(s12).
Since from Lemma 7 s11, s12 and s14 are best replies to s22 and s22under ,
N1j for all j = 1, 2, 3, it follows that s12 is a Bayesian best reply to s24 if and only
if,
(a) pi1(s2, s2) ≥ pi1(s1, s4)
(b) pi1(s2, s2) ≥ pi1(s4, s2)
(c) pi1(s2, s2) ≥ pi1(s4, s4).
From Table 2 and the definitions of N11,N12and N13 we observe that,
pi1(s2, s2) = V m1u + r ≥pi1(s1, s4) = r always holdspi1(s4, s2) = V m1u + V c1d + r holds if N1 = N11, N12
pi1(s4, s4) = V c1u + V
c
1d + r always holds
 (17)
(s2, s2)is a PBEP iff,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≥ θ2(1− φ)
(θ1 + θ2)φ
and N1 = N11, N12.
This proves part (d) of Theorem 2.
We now consider the necessary and sufficient conditions for(s4, s4) to be a PBEP.
We have already proved that s24 is a best reply to s14iff,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≤ (1− φ)
φ
(18)
Thus, if (s4, s4) is a PBEP we know s24 is a best reply to s14 so that inequality
(18) must hold. Conversely, suppose (18) holds. Then we know s24 is a best reply
to s14. But, in order for (s4, s4) to be a PBEP, we must have,
pi1(s4, s4) ≥ pi1(si, b2(si)) ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4
where
s24 = b2(s14).
Since from Lemma 7 s11, s12 and s14 are identified as best replies to s22 and
s24 under N1j for all j = 1, 2, 3, it follows that s14 is a Bayesian best reply to s24 if
and only if,
(a) pi1(s4, s4) ≥ pi1(s1, s4)
(b) pi1(s4, s4) ≥ pi1(s2, s4) (19)
(c) pi1(s4, s4) ≥ pi1(s2, s2).
But we have shown under part (d) that (s2, s2) cannot be a PBEB if N1 = N13.
Hence s22 6= b2(s14) when (18) holds. Therefore, (19.c) drops out.
From Table 2 and the definitions of N1j for all j = 1, 2, 3we observe that,
pi1(s4, s4) = V c1u + V
c
1d + r ≥pi1(s1, s4) = r holds if V
c
1u + V
c
1d+ ≥ 0
and N1 = N13
pi1(s2, s4) = V c1u + r holds if N1 = N13
 (20)
(s4, s4)is a PBEP iff,
(−) (V
c
2d |N22)
(V c2d |N23)
≤ (1− φ)
φ
and N1 = N13.
This proves part (c) of Theorem 2.
Finally, we consider the necessary and sufficient conditions for (s1, s4) to be a
PBEP.
First recall from Lemma 5 that s24 = b2(s11) under N2j for all j = 1, 2, 3
independent of Player 1’s type. But this is an ex-post condition, i.e., s24 is a best
reply to s11 for all N2j j = 1, 2, 3once player 1 chooses s11 strategy. However, Player
1 choosess11 as a Bayesian best reply to s24 if and only if, Epi2(s1, s4) ≥Epi2(s1, s2)
and N1 = N11 .
Recall that firm 2’s dominant strategies are s22 and s24 under either N22 or N23.
Hence, we will first prove that, ex-ante, s24 is a best reply s11 if and only if,
Epi2(s1, s4) ≥ Epi2(s1, s2) (21)
where,
Epi2(s1s4) = Pr(N22 | s11)pi2(s1, s4 |N22) + Pr(N23 | s11)pi2(s1, s4 |N23) (22)
Epi2(s1s2) = Pr(N22 | s11)pi2(s1, s2 |N22) + Pr(N23 | s11)pi2(s1, s2 |N23) (23)
We use Bayes’s rule to calculate Pr(N22 | s11)and Pr(N23 | s11):
Pr(N22 | s11) = Pr(s11 |N22) Pr(N22)Pr(s11) =
{ Pr(s11 |N22) }φ
{ Pr(s11 |N22) }φ+ {Pr(s11 |N23) } (1− φ) (24)
where φand 1− φare the priors for Pr(N22) and Pr(N23) respectively.
But from Lemma 8 (a) we have,
Pr(s11 |N22) = 0
Pr(s11 |N22) = Pr(N11) = θ1
which upon substitution into (24) yields:
Pr(N22 | s11) = 0.
It follows that,
Pr(N23 | s11) = 1.
From Table 2 and the definitions of N22, N23we observe that:
pi2(s1, s4 | N22) = pi2(s1, s2 | N23) = V m2u + V m2d + r > 0
and,
pi2(s1, s2 | N22) = pi2(s1, s2 | N23) = V m2u + r > 0
Therefore, substituting the expressions for Pr(N2j | s11) , pi2(s1, s4 |N2j) and
pi2(s1, s4 | N2j) , j = 2, 3 into (22) and (23), we can write the inequality (21) as,
V m2u + V
m
2d + r ≥ V m2u + r ⇒ V m2d ≥ 0.
But, V m2d ≥ 0 is always true by the definition of payoffs. Therefore (21) always
holds. Hence, we have shown that s14 is always a best reply to s11independent of
player 1’s and player 2’s types.
Now, if (s1, s4) is a PBEP then we know s24is a best reply to s11 so that (21)
holds. Conversely, suppose (21) holds. Then we know s24 is a best reply to s11.
However, in order for (s1, s4) to be a PBEP we must have:
pi1(s1, s4) ≥pi1(si, b2(si)) ∀ i = 1, 2, 3, 4 where s24 = b2(s11).
But from Table 3 this can only occur if,
(a) pi1(s1, s4) ≥ pi1(s2, s4)
(b) pi1(s1, s4) ≥ pi1(s2, s2)
(c) pi1(s1, s4) ≥ pi1(s4, s2) (25)
(d) pi1(s1, s4) ≥ pi1(s4, s4)
Recalling from part (b) that we have shown s24 = b2(s12) iff (6) holds.
Also recall from part (e)that we have shown s22 = b2(s12) iff (1) holds.
But, we have proved that (1) and (6) can not hold together. Therefore, (25.c)
drops out since s22 6= b2(s12) when (6) holds. We also noted in proving part (b)
that s22 6= b2(s14) when (6) holds. Therefore, (25.b) also drops out.
This argument shows that in order fors24 to be a best reply to either s12or s14
must hold as the binding condition. From Table 2. and the definitions N11, N12 and
N13we observe that:
pi1(s1, s4) = r ≥
{
pi1(s2, s4) = V c1u + r holds if N1 = N11
pi1(s4, s4) = V c1u + V
c
1d + r holds if N1 = N11
}
(26)
Therefore, we conclude that (s1, s4) is a PBEP iff,
(−) (V c2d |N22)(V c2d |N23) ≤
θ2(1−φ)
(θ1+θ2)φ
and N1 = N11 .
This proves part (a) of Theorem 2. uunionsq
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